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  When	  a	  building	  or	  district	  is	  designated	  by	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  it	  provides	  a	  steep	  measure	  of	  protection	  and	  regulation	  for	  the	  building,	  assuring	  the	  building	  or	  district	  will	  move	  forward	  in	  time	  utilizing	  managed	  change	  to	  retain	  the	  special	  qualities	  and	  character	  that	  define	  it	  as	  a	  landmark.	  	  	  When	  a	  New	  York	  City	  Landmark	  or	  District	  suffers	  from	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  it	  is	  an	  affront	  to	  the	  entire	  premise	  of	  what	  the	  designation	  represents.	  Although	  not	  widespread,	  the	  rupture	  a	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  produces	  in	  a	  streetscape	  is	  jarring	  and	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  In	  many	  instances,	  the	  harm	  caused	  by	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  extends	  beyond	  the	  loss	  of	  character.	  	  Physical	  deterioration	  and	  abandonment	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  squatting	  and	  associated	  problems	  with	  fire	  and	  a	  litany	  of	  illegal	  activities,	  imperiling	  not	  only	  the	  building	  in	  question,	  but	  the	  neighboring	  buildings	  as	  well.	  	  Yet,	  despite	  the	  seriousness	  of	  this	  condition	  both	  to	  urban	  heritage	  and	  the	  health,	  safety,	  and	  welfare	  of	  the	  city	  residents,	  there	  is	  an	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  or	  other	  city	  agencies	  to	  deal	  with	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  completely	  despite	  the	  regulatory	  mechanism	  provided	  by	  the	  landmark	  laws.	  My	  thesis	  will	  examine	  the	  conditions	  which	  precede	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  when	  it	  occurs	  among	  designated	  properties	  and	  within	  historic	  districts;	  assert	  that	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  has	  matured	  from	  an	  agency	  whose	  purpose	  was	  to	  identify	  historic	  resources	  to	  one	  which	  must	  now	  focus	  more	  on	  managing	  and	  protecting	  the	  resources	  it	  has	  previously	  singled	  out	  as	  illustrated	  through	  demolition	  by	  neglect;	  determine	  why	  the	  landmarks	  law	  and	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  has	  not	  been	  as	  effective	  in	  diminishing	  this	  problem	  through	  regulation	  and	  enforcement	  as	  one	  might	  hope;	  identify	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  can	  be	  improved	  and	  identify	  tools	  that	  may	  be	  utilized	  in	  tandem	  with	  established	  Commission	  avenues	  to	  produce	  a	  more	  dexterous	  approach	  to	  a	  complex	  problem.	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Introduction	  	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  process	  of	  allowing	  a	  building	  to	  deteriorate	  to	  the	  point	  where	  demolition	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  public	  health	  and	  safety.	  Analyzing	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  historic	  preservation	  often	  yields	  the	  dominant	  cause	  of	  the	  problem	  to	  be	  the	  rapacious	  developer.	  The	  National	  Trust	  for	  Historic	  Preservation’s	  material	  on	  Preservation	  Law	  defines	  it	  in	  this	  way:	  ’Demolition	  by	  Neglect’	  is	  the	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  property	  owner	  intentionally	  allows	  a	  historic	  property	  to	  suffer	  severe	  deterioration,	  potentially	  beyond	  the	  point	  of	  repair.	  Property	  owners	  may	  use	  this	  kind	  of	  long-­‐term	  neglect	  to	  circumvent	  historic	  preservation	  regulations.1	  Although	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  a	  strategic	  approach	  by	  a	  wily	  property	  owner	  to	  remove	  an	  encumbrance	  to	  development	  does	  happen,	  it	  is	  vastly	  overstated	  as	  the	  fundamental	  or	  most	  common	  cause.	  Designation	  does	  not	  typically	  spur	  demolition	  by	  neglect;	  it	  is	  most	  commonly	  a	  collision	  of	  preservation	  with	  timeless	  social	  problems	  like	  lack	  of	  resources	  and	  mental	  illness.	  Thus	  the	  assumption	  that	  historic	  preservation	  regulations	  produce	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  an	  oversimplification	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  	  Misunderstanding	  or	  overstating	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  developer	  hinders	  our	  ability	  to	  confront	  the	  problem	  effectively.	  More	  refined	  tools	  to	  confront	  the	  issue	  could	  be	  developed	  through	  understanding	  the	  wider	  spectrum	  of	  causes.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  elucidate	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  problem	  through	  five	  case	  studies	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of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  of	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks.	  The	  following	  (Figure	  1)	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  seen	  from	  the	  exterior:	  
	  Figure	  1.	  56	  Cambridge	  Place	  Clinton	  Hill	  Historic	  District,	  Brooklyn,	  NY.	  2004.	  Photograph	  courtesy	  LPC	  NYC	  	  	  The	  five	  case	  studies	  will	  encompass	  the	  eight	  predominant	  causes	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  in	  New	  York	  City	  that	  my	  research	  has	  identified.	  Due	  to	  a	  tendency	  for	  causation	  to	  cluster,	  the	  eight	  causes	  are	  readily	  represented	  through	  five	  studies.	  The	  eight	  causes	  I	  have	  isolated	  as	  antecedents	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  are	  as	  follows:	  
• Lack	  of	  resources	  (money	  and/or	  access	  to	  credit)	  
• Advanced	  age/senility/dementia	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• Severe	  mental	  illness	  or	  intellectual	  disability	  
• Inheritance	  issues/intestate	  
• Fragmented	  ownership	  as	  through	  organizations	  such	  as	  non-­‐profits	  
• Mortgage	  Fraud	  
• City	  Auction	  
• Strategic	   	  	  The	  case	  studies	  were	  chosen	  to	  represent	  both	  individual	  landmarks	  and	  buildings	  within	  designated	  historic	  districts,	  as	  well	  as	  variables	  in	  income,	  race,	  and	  period	  of	  designation.	  Finally,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  building’s	  resolution	  was	  considered	  and	  includes	  two	  that	  are	  active	  and	  their	  fate	  is	  unknown,	  one	  that	  was	  resolved	  after	  a	  trial,	  one	  that	  was	  a	  pre-­‐trial	  settlement	  of	  a	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  lawsuit,	  and	  one	  that	  was	  resolved	  without	  any	  litigious	  action.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  frequently	  over-­‐attributed	  to	  the	  developer	  is	  because	  it	  is	  a	  viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  preservation.	  The	  case	  studies	  are	  New	  York	  City	  designated	  landmarks	  because	  my	  introduction	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  was	  through	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  (LPC)	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  has	  an	  entirely	  different	  significance	  when	  it	  occurs	  to	  a	  designated	  historic	  landmark.	  An	  abandoned	  deteriorating	  building	  anywhere	  is	  unsettling.	  An	  abandoned	  and	  deteriorating	  designated	  landmark	  is	  not	  only	  an	  affront,	  it	  is	  illegal	  (See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Law	  N.Y.	  ADC.	  LAW	  §	  25-­‐311:	  NY	  Code	  -­‐	  Section	  25-­‐311:	  Maintenance	  and	  repair	  of	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improvements).	  	  Once	  a	  building	  is	  designated,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  a	  demolition	  permit—demolition	  was	  precisely	  what	  Preservation	  Commissions	  and	  Laws	  were	  designed	  to	  thwart	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  obtuse	  way	  to	  remove	  an	  obstacle	  Landmark	  from	  the	  land	  is	  for	  the	  city	  to	  declare	  it	  as	  a	  public	  safety	  hazard	  (See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Law	  N.Y.	  ADC.	  LAW	  §	  25-­‐312:	  NY	  Code	  -­‐	  Section	  25-­‐312:	  Remedying	  of	  dangerous	  conditions).	  This	  is	  where	  the	  misconception	  of	  the	  developer	  comes	  into	  play—the	  developer	  is	  an	  old	  and	  storied	  enemy	  in	  preservation	  and	  for	  a	  reason,	  but	  we	  cannot	  let	  our	  history	  distort	  our	  perception	  of	  this	  multifaceted	  and	  important	  problem.	  	  
	  This	  thesis	  will	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  heretofore	  unrecognized	  patterns	  of	  causation	  utilizing	  thorough	  case	  studies.	  Through	  insight	  into	  the	  causes	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  this	  thesis	  will	  alert	  the	  preservation	  community	  to	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  the	  problem.	  Once	  this	  is	  understood,	  there	  will	  be	  opportunities	  for	  preservation	  to	  arrive	  at	  complementary	  responses	  to	  augment	  those	  already	  in	  place.	  Discerning	  whether	  a	  property	  owner	  is	  unwilling	  or	  incapable	  of	  keeping	  the	  building	  in	  good	  repair	  is	  paramount.	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  often	  manifests	  itself	  as	  a	  problem	  perpetuated	  by	  people	  who	  have	  no	  intention	  of	  damaging	  a	  designated	  building,	  sometimes	  they	  do	  not	  even	  perceive	  it	  as	  a	  landmark.	  Two	  of	  the	  case	  study	  buildings	  were	  sealed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  designation,	  illustrating	  the	  point	  that	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  can,	  and	  does,	  precede	  designation.	  809	  Prospect	  Place	  in	  Brooklyn	  (Figures	  2	  and	  3)	  was	  designated	  at	  least	  ten	  years	  after	  it	  was	  abandoned	  by	  quarreling	  brothers	  following	  an	  inheritance.	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  Figure	  2.	  809	  Prospect	  Place	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  Historic	  District,	  Brooklyn.	  2012.	  Photograph	  by	  author	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  Figure	  3.	  809	  Prospect	  Place	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  Historic	  District,	  Brooklyn.	  2012.	  Photograph	  by	  author	  	  Ironically	  further	  clouding	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  LPC	  has	  initiated	  lawsuits	  and	  is	  successful	  in	  its	  strategy	  to	  force	  the	  owner	  to	  repair	  and	  restore	  the	  building,	  it	  received	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  press.	  The	  two	  most	  famously	  successful	  lawsuits	  that	  the	  LPC	  brought	  and	  won	  for	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  were	  both	  against	  very	  wealthy	  developers—the	  Skidmore	  House	  in	  Lower	  Manhattan	  and	  the	  Windermere	  (Figure	  4)	  in	  Midtown	  Manhattan.2	  Because	  these	  two	  cases	  are	  high-­‐profile	  successes	  in	  preservation	  law	  against	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  they	  unintentionally	  reinforce	  the	  concept	  that	  the	  primary	  culprit	  is	  the	  developer.	  A	  review	  of	  literature	  on	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  acknowledges	  that	  sometimes	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  the	  result	  of	  poor	  estate	  planning	  or	  destitution,	  but	  then	  the	  literature	  cites	  the	  New	  York	  City	  victories	  with	  Skidmore	  and	  the	  Windermere	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and	  the	  more	  typical	  and	  less	  sensational	  underlying	  causes	  are	  once	  again	  obscured.3	  
	  	  Most	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  scholarship	  approaches	  the	  problem	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  enforcement,	  law,	  and	  recommendations	  for	  new	  or	  amended	  legislation.4	  The	  effectiveness	  and	  teeth	  of	  Landmarks	  Law,	  particularly	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  is	  valuable	  and	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  Conversely,	  it	  also	  cannot	  be	  overestimated.	  The	  aspect	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  sue	  for	  the	  fair	  market	  value	  of	  the	  building	  or	  the	  land,	  whichever	  is	  greater,	  is	  a	  potent	  disincentive	  for	  an	  individual	  with	  resources	  and	  a	  motive	  for	  their	  behavior	  (See	  Appendix	  A	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Law	  N.Y.	  ADC.	  LAW	  §	  25-­‐317.1:	  NY	  Code	  -­‐	  Section	  25-­‐317.1:	  Civil	  penalties).	  When	  the	  owner	  has	  little	  or	  no	  motive	  for	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allowing	  their	  building	  to	  fall	  down,	  and	  their	  presumed	  action	  is	  only	  a	  complete	  inability	  to	  deal	  with	  or	  even	  comprehend	  that	  the	  building	  is	  collapsing,	  is	  when	  litigation	  is	  disproportionate	  and	  misdirected.	  	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  using	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed—I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  different	  aspects	  of	  any	  given	  problem	  require	  solutions	  directed	  specifically	  at	  the	  target.	  The	  Commission	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  nuances	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  and	  handles	  the	  amorphous	  problem	  with	  latitude	  and	  discretion.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Commission	  would	  be	  well	  served	  by	  having	  more	  calibrated	  tools	  beyond	  litigation,	  possibly	  including	  an	  outside	  entity	  better	  equipped	  to	  respond	  rapidly	  to	  an	  incompetent	  or	  destitute	  owner.	  	  
	  This	  thesis	  advocates	  for	  the	  larger	  preservation	  community	  being	  informed	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  issue,	  so	  that	  resources	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Commission	  may	  be	  dexterously	  applied	  to	  the	  problem.	  The	  underlying	  primary	  issue	  behind	  an	  inability	  to	  handle	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  thoroughly	  and	  elegantly	  as	  possible	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  human	  and	  financial	  resources.	  Once	  the	  myriad	  causes	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  are	  understood,	  solutions	  will	  come	  more	  readily	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  capital	  needed	  to	  support	  the	  significant	  expense	  of	  containing	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  Other	  municipalities	  have	  programs	  in	  place	  that	  include	  revolving	  funds,	  grants,	  and	  receivership	  along	  with	  more	  broadly	  based	  programs	  such	  as	  tax	  increment	  financing.	  New	  York	  City	  utilizes	  a	  third	  party	  transfer	  program	  through	  the	  Housing	  Preservation	  and	  Development	  (HPD)	  agency	  that	  allows	  for	  abandoned	  properties	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  individuals	  with	  the	  financial	  wherewithal	  to	  stabilize	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a	  building	  quickly	  and	  turn	  it	  around.	  Although	  a	  useful	  option	  in	  theory,	  qualifying	  for	  the	  program	  can	  be	  difficult	  due	  to	  requirements	  that	  the	  property	  be	  heavily	  encumbered	  with	  unpaid	  taxes	  and	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation,	  essentially	  requiring	  a	  blighted	  block	  (See	  Appendix	  C	  for	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  HPD’s	  Third	  Party	  Transfer	  Program).	  Receivership	  could	  be	  used	  in	  New	  York	  City	  and	  was	  successfully	  utilized	  once	  in	  a	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  case	  by	  the	  LPC	  and	  the	  New	  York	  Landmarks	  Conservancy	  in	  1995.5	  Why	  this	  potential	  alternative	  solution	  has	  never	  been	  revisited	  is	  unclear,	  but	  likely	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  significant	  sum	  of	  money	  involved	  in	  stabilizing	  a	  structurally	  unsound	  building	  with	  an	  economically	  unsteady	  owner;	  it	  is	  an	  unattractive	  tableau.6	  The	  extraordinary	  human	  and	  economic	  resources	  of	  the	  New	  York	  City	  preservation	  community	  could	  rally	  around	  this	  issue	  and	  effectively	  augment	  the	  existing	  tools	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission.	  	  	  The	  literature	  is	  abundant	  with	  lamentations	  of	  how	  underfunded	  preservation	  commissions	  are,	  and	  the	  fallout	  from	  said	  paucity	  tends	  to	  inhibit	  enforcement	  and	  monitoring	  programs	  nationwide.7	  New	  York	  City	  has	  close	  to	  30,000	  designated	  buildings	  and	  new	  buildings	  and	  districts	  are	  proposed	  continually.	  As	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  regulating	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  extraordinarily	  valuable	  real	  estate	  and	  the	  maturation	  of	  the	  agency	  into	  one	  that	  enforces	  the	  designations	  it	  is	  empowered	  to	  grant,	  the	  City	  of	  New	  York	  and	  its	  citizenry	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  adequate	  agency	  funding	  is	  critical.	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  affects	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks—there	  are	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approximately	  60	  buildings	  at	  any	  given	  time	  that	  are	  known	  to	  the	  LPC	  to	  meet	  the	  definition	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  However,	  when	  the	  problem	  does	  emerge	  it	  drains	  the	  time	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  several	  other	  attendant	  city	  agencies	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  and	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation.	  Continually	  triaging	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  buildings	  and	  their	  owners,	  the	  Commission	  must	  be	  adequately	  funded	  to	  identify,	  stabilize,	  and	  resolve	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  a	  most	  egregious	  antithesis	  to	  preservation.	  	  	  In	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  they	  stand,	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  buildings	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  physical	  fabric,	  the	  rupture	  they	  represent	  to	  preservation,	  and	  the	  neighborhood.	  When	  a	  building	  succumbs	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  the	  structural	  integrity	  of	  the	  building	  is	  compromised	  through	  water	  infiltration	  and	  interior	  collapse.	  The	  architectural	  detail	  that	  defines	  it	  as	  a	  Landmark	  is	  eroded	  or	  removed	  for	  sale	  in	  the	  lucrative	  salvage	  and	  architectural	  antiques	  market.	  These	  buildings	  are	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  fires	  as	  squatters,	  drug	  dealers,	  and	  prostitution	  overtakes	  them.	  The	  infestation	  of	  the	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  by	  crime	  in	  turn	  erodes	  the	  sense	  of	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  any	  given	  block	  it	  is	  present	  on.	  Buildings	  are	  manifest	  expressions	  of	  their	  owners.	  When	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  building	  is	  deeply	  distressed	  or	  absent,	  the	  building	  reads	  that	  way	  on	  the	  street.	  Some	  people	  respond	  to	  the	  evident	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  building	  and	  hence	  the	  owner	  by	  taking	  advantage	  of	  its	  monetary	  value	  and	  abandoning	  it	  as	  collateral	  damage	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  my	  case	  studies	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  and	  a	  ruthless	  developer.	  Still	  others	  read	  it	  as	  an	  affront	  to	  their	  community,	  the	  Landmark	  designation,	  and	  as	  a	  cry	  for	  help	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as	  seen	  in	  my	  case	  studies	  involving	  dilute	  ownership,	  profound	  psychological	  impairments,	  and	  city	  auction.	  The	  destruction	  or	  decay	  of	  the	  historic	  fabric	  of	  the	  building	  that	  arouses	  the	  ire	  of	  preservationists	  thus	  becomes	  a	  catalyst	  for	  an	  externality	  of	  the	  preservation	  movement.	  	  	  Never	  intended	  to	  mitigate	  severe	  social	  problems,	  preservation	  commissions	  are	  now	  placed	  in	  the	  position	  of	  negotiating	  the	  waters	  of	  our	  country’s	  most	  pressing	  social	  problems.	  Preservation	  was	  promoted	  in	  the	  1960s	  as	  a	  way	  to	  combat	  rootlessness	  in	  an	  era	  of	  disorienting	  change.8	  Today,	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  is	  battling	  irresponsible	  banking,	  foreclosure,	  and	  mortgage	  fraud	  among	  other	  more	  fundamental	  and	  fragile	  issues	  like	  poverty	  and	  mental	  illness—all	  the	  while	  mediating	  change	  one	  rooftop	  addition	  at	  a	  time.	  This	  observation	  is	  not	  to	  be	  read	  as	  an	  outcry	  against	  the	  leaks	  in	  our	  social	  support	  system	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  inform	  the	  preservation	  community	  of	  the	  exceptional	  ways	  in	  which	  preservation	  can	  be	  highly	  relevant,	  useful,	  and	  well	  beyond	  the	  domain	  of	  an	  esoteric	  pursuit.	  	  	  The	  following	  five	  case	  studies	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  represent	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  problem,	  as	  it	  presents	  itself	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  first	  case	  study,	  is	  a	  study	  involving	  a	  non-­‐profit	  that	  was	  never	  formally	  dissolved,	  where	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  organization	  died	  without	  making	  provisions	  for	  the	  entity	  or	  the	  building	  in	  her	  will.	  It	  serves	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  dilute	  ownership	  and	  inadequate	  succession	  planning.	  Chapter	  3	  is	  a	  case	  study	  involving	  a	  developer	  intent	  on	  challenging	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several	  aspects	  of	  designation,	  including	  the	  designation	  itself—this	  case	  illustrates	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  a	  strategic	  attempt	  to	  rid	  oneself	  of	  a	  designated	  landmark.	  Chapter	  4	  is	  a	  study	  of	  an	  elderly	  hoarder	  in	  Brooklyn	  who	  inherited	  multiple	  properties	  and	  was	  never	  well	  equipped	  to	  handle	  them	  as	  a	  study	  of	  inheritance,	  advanced	  age	  and	  mental	  illness.	  Chapter	  5	  is	  an	  unresolved	  case	  study	  involving	  an	  owner	  who	  purchased	  a	  sealed	  building	  in	  Harlem	  at	  a	  city	  auction	  almost	  30	  years	  ago	  and	  is	  still	  unable	  to	  commence	  restoration	  of	  the	  building	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  resources.	  Chapter	  6	  is	  a	  case	  study	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  in	  a	  recently	  designated	  historic	  district.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  National	  Trust	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  Preservation,	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  Educational	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  Trust	  for	  Historic	  Preservation,	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  1,	  accessed	  May	  8,	  2013,http://www.preservationnation.org/information-­‐center/law-­‐and-­‐policy/legal-­‐resources/preservation-­‐law-­‐101/resources/Demolition-­‐By-­‐Neglect.pdf.	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CASE	  STUDY	  ONE	  467	  West	  140th	  Street,	  New	  York,	  NY	  	  Status:	  Resolved	  	  	  Cause:	  Fragmented	  Ownership	  	   	  
	  	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  is	  a	  resolved	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  in	  the	  Hamilton	  Heights	  Historic	  District	  in	  Harlem.	  Built	  in	  1901	  as	  one	  of	  five	  of	  the	  earliest	  buildings	  on	  a	  block	  of	  West	  140th	  Street,	  it	  is	  a	  modest	  three-­‐story	  rowhouse	  with	  fairly	  simple	  ornamentation.1	  The	  Hamilton	  Heights	  Historic	  District	  was	  proposed	  in	  1966	  and	  designated	  by	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  in	  1974.	  The	  designation	  report	  speaks	  earnestly	  of	  the	  pride	  the	  community	  has	  in	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their	  neighborhood	  and	  to	  the	  “generally	  excellent	  maintenance”	  of	  the	  buildings.2	  Unfortunately,	  Hamilton	  Heights	  has	  been	  plagued	  by	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  in	  recent	  years,	  despite	  the	  Commission’s	  declaration	  that,	  “Designation	  of	  the	  District	  will	  strengthen	  the	  community	  by	  preventing	  further	  loss	  through	  a	  process	  of	  reviewing	  plans	  for	  alteration	  and	  new	  construction.	  Designation	  is	  a	  major	  step	  towards	  insuring	  the	  protection	  and	  enhancement	  of	  the	  quality	  and	  character	  of	  the	  entire	  neighborhood.”3	  Sadly,	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  an	  insidious	  process	  that	  does	  not	  submit	  itself	  for	  permits	  or	  review	  and	  moves	  very	  stealthily.	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  is	  a	  case	  study	  illustrative	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  caused	  by	  a	  fragmented	  ownership	  profile	  that	  was	  produced	  by	  the	  death	  of	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  organization	  who	  neglected	  to	  account	  for	  maintenance	  or	  termination	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  building	  that	  housed	  it.	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467	  West	  140th	  Street	  was	  built	  as	  speculative	  housing	  and	  served	  as	  residential	  until	  it	  was	  purchased	  in	  1950	  by	  an	  organization	  called	  the	  Adam	  Clayton	  Powell	  Senior	  Fund,	  Inc.	  Soon	  thereafter,	  the	  corporation	  was	  renamed	  the	  Intercultural	  Educational	  Fund,	  Inc.	  Founded	  by	  Katherine	  “Katie”	  J.	  Hicks	  and	  her	  husband	  George	  W.	  “Bud”	  Hicks	  in	  1946,	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  fledgling	  non-­‐profit	  was	  to	  “help	  children	  obtain	  a	  good	  education,	  giving	  them	  the	  necessary	  counseling	  required	  in	  order	  that	  they	  might	  join	  society	  with	  the	  parents	  of	  these	  children	  so	  that	  they	  too	  could	  share	  in	  the	  guiding	  of	  their	  children	  into	  the	  world	  as	  productive	  citizens.4”	  Although	  somewhat	  inscrutable,	  the	  statement	  reveals	  Kate	  Hicks	  devotion	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  helping	  children	  and	  their	  families,	  who	  could	  fall	  through	  the	  cracks	  without	  intervention.	  	  	  The	  building	  at	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  was	  the	  physical	  presence	  of	  the	  guidance	  center.	  Thirty	  thousand	  children	  and	  their	  families	  are	  reputed	  to	  have	  passed	  through	  its	  doors	  for	  remedial	  English	  and	  mathematics	  classes,	  counseling	  and	  support	  groups,	  and	  so	  forth,	  until	  it	  drifted	  into	  oblivion	  following	  the	  death	  of	  its	  charismatic	  founder	  in	  1989.	  A	  newspaper	  article	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Amsterdam	  
News	  in	  1988	  laments	  “another”	  robbery	  at	  the	  Vocational	  Guidance	  and	  Workshop	  Center,	  the	  popular	  name	  for	  the	  organization.	  Described	  as	  “ransacked”,	  the	  article	  states,	  “A	  file	  cabinet	  system	  was	  overturned,	  years	  of	  accurate	  records	  and	  reports	  on	  30,000	  children,	  their	  first	  contact	  with	  the	  Center	  and	  their	  present	  whereabouts,	  strewn	  about	  the	  floor	  in	  wild	  disarray.	  Police	  are	  investigating	  this	  apparent	  ‘inside	  job.’”5	  	  Following	  the	  aforementioned	  robberies,	  a	  fire,	  and	  finally	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water	  damage	  from	  the	  roof	  collapsing,	  virtually	  all	  records	  on	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  people	  who	  attended	  and	  volunteered	  were	  lost.	  	  	  The	  Intercultural	  Educational	  Fund	  floundered	  about	  until	  around	  1992	  under	  the	  well-­‐intentioned	  direction	  of	  the	  Executive	  Director.	  As	  the	  once	  strong	  teachers	  and	  Board	  of	  Directors	  slowly	  disappeared	  from	  lack	  of	  leadership,	  vision,	  and	  funds,	  the	  building	  began	  to	  reveal	  the	  deteriorated	  condition	  of	  the	  organization.	  Long	  before	  city	  agencies	  are	  aware	  a	  building	  has	  been	  abandoned,	  the	  drug	  and	  salvage	  dealers	  arrive	  and	  functionally	  seize	  and	  strip	  the	  building.	  Concomitant	  squatting	  typically	  results	  in	  a	  fire	  that	  further	  damages	  the	  structure.	  Once	  this	  threshold	  has	  been	  reached,	  the	  building	  is	  sealed	  and	  often	  forgotten.	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  is	  exemplary	  of	  this	  pattern	  of	  abandonment.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  building	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2012,	  it	  had	  been	  abandoned	  and	  sealed	  for	  twenty	  years.	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This	  speaks	  to	  a	  fascinating	  aspect	  regarding	  the	  reporting	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  cases	  to	  city	  agencies.	  Unless	  in	  an	  area	  that	  is	  fairly	  affluent	  and	  holds	  strong	  identity	  association	  through	  being	  in	  an	  historic	  district,	  it	  is	  surprisingly	  unlikely	  that	  an	  abandoned	  building	  will	  be	  reported	  to	  the	  LPC.	  Often	  it	  is	  not	  until	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  offending	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  has	  reached	  the	  adjacent	  buildings	  that	  complaints	  begin	  to	  come	  into	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  and/or	  the	  LPC.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  467	  West	  140th	  Street,	  it	  was	  a	  concerned	  neighbor	  who	  had	  a	  professional	  relationship	  with	  Mark	  Silberman,	  General	  Counsel	  for	  the	  LPC,	  who	  contacted	  the	  LPC	  once	  it	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  DOB	  for	  possible	  demolition.	  	  	  As	  the	  neighbor’s	  complaints	  mounted,	  the	  building	  was	  rapidly	  investigated	  and	  the	  profile	  of	  fragmented	  organizational	  ownership	  emerged.	  Encumbered	  with	  thirty	  Board	  members,	  tax	  liens	  that	  reached	  $100,000	  and	  numerous	  fines	  from	  the	  city’s	  interventions,	  the	  building	  did	  appear	  doomed	  on	  all	  fronts.	  However,	  a	  standard	  rowhouse	  demolition	  in	  New	  York	  City	  costs	  approximately	  $250,000.00,	  making	  it	  highly	  desirable	  for	  the	  responsible	  party	  to	  try	  to	  sell	  the	  building	  as	  a	  shell,	  rather	  than	  have	  it	  demolished.	  Of	  course,	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  does	  not	  support	  designated	  buildings	  being	  destroyed	  and	  will	  try	  every	  avenue	  to	  alter	  that	  course.	  While	  the	  Commission	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  bring	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  owner	  for	  allowing	  the	  building	  to	  deteriorate,	  that	  avenue	  would	  have	  been	  useless	  in	  terms	  of	  time	  and	  effort.	  Having	  been	  compromised	  severely	  by	  two	  decades	  of	  neglect,	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  was	  very	  aggressive	  about	  pursuing	  immediate	  demolition	  in	  the	  name	  of	  public	  safety.	  While	  DOB	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concerns	  are	  certainly	  valid,	  they	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  LPC's	  mission	  to	  save	  designated	  buildings.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  energy	  was	  expended	  trying	  to	  mollify	  the	  DOB	  while	  also	  attempting	  to	  gather	  thirty	  people	  who	  had	  drifted	  away	  or	  died	  over	  the	  course	  of	  twenty	  years.	  	  	  Locating	  the	  thirty	  people	  listed	  on	  the	  Vocational	  Guidance	  and	  Workshop	  Center’s	  letterhead	  as	  Board	  Members	  was	  a	  painstaking	  effort	  required	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  because	  the	  non-­‐profit	  was	  never	  formally	  dissolved.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  building	  as	  an	  asset	  had	  to	  be	  disposed	  of	  with	  all	  proceeds	  going	  to	  a	  different	  non-­‐profit	  with	  a	  fundamentally	  similar	  mission.	  As	  a	  result,	  all	  living	  members	  had	  to	  be	  gathered	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  proposed	  sale	  of	  the	  shell	  at	  467	  West	  140th	  Street.	  (See	  Appendix	  B:	  New	  York	  State	  Office	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General-­‐-­‐A	  Guide	  to	  Sales	  and	  other	  Dispositions	  of	  Assets	  Pursuant	  to	  Not-­‐For-­‐Profit	  Corporation	  Law	  §§	  510	  -­‐	  511	  and	  Religious	  Corporations	  Law	  §	  12).	  	  	  Fortunately	  the	  Center’s	  Executive	  Director	  was	  found	  fairly	  readily	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  proved	  an	  eager	  party.	  Unlike	  most	  negligent	  owners	  who	  are	  usually	  dismayed	  over	  being	  called	  to	  task	  by	  Landmarks,	  the	  Executive	  Director	  came	  forward	  excited	  that	  she	  was	  part	  owner	  and	  thinking	  she	  could	  potentially	  profit	  from	  the	  proceeds	  from	  the	  sale.	  However,	  the	  Charities	  Bureau	  of	  The	  New	  York	  State	  Office	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General	  is	  very	  clear	  to	  the	  contrary,	  “The	  use	  of	  the	  proceeds	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  corporation’s	  purposes.	   Sale	  proceeds	  cannot	  be	  used	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  director,	  officer,	  employee,	  member	  or	  other	  interested	  party.”	  6	  Despite	  the	  clarity	  of	  the	  Charities	  Bureau’s	  statement,	  the	  
	   22	  
Executive	  Director	  remained	  insistent	  that	  she	  was	  owed	  back	  pay	  for	  her	  duties	  as	  Executive	  Director	  in	  the	  late	  years	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  She	  was	  still	  attempting	  to	  argue	  for	  payment	  with	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing.	  	  	  Ever	  hopeful	  for	  her	  day	  of	  retribution,	  the	  director	  was	  simultaneously	  helpful	  and	  a	  nuisance	  with	  regard	  to	  locating	  the	  other	  Board	  members.	  She	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  choreograph	  the	  outcome	  by	  leading	  me	  to	  some	  people	  and	  dismissing	  others	  flippantly	  as	  dead,	  useless,	  unpleasant	  or	  expatriated.7	  When	  I	  repeatedly	  explained	  to	  her	  that	  death	  had	  to	  be	  proven	  and	  personality	  conflicts	  were	  irrelevant,	  she	  would	  become	  peevish	  and	  retreat.	  Despite	  her	  attempts	  to	  direct	  the	  outcome,	  I	  managed	  to	  locate	  or	  confirm	  the	  death	  of	  all	  Board	  members	  within	  six	  weeks	  through	  census	  records,	  newspaper	  articles,	  and	  interviews.	  In	  the	  end,	  ten	  Board	  members	  appeared	  or	  conference	  called	  in	  to	  a	  Board	  meeting	  held	  in	  July	  of	  2012	  at	  the	  law	  firm	  handling	  the	  case	  pro-­‐bono	  for	  the	  defunct	  organization.	  	  	  Not	  to	  be	  cowed	  by	  the	  law	  that	  any	  proceeds	  go	  to	  another	  non-­‐profit	  with	  a	  similar	  mission,	  she	  tried	  heartily	  to	  produce	  appropriate	  non-­‐profits	  to	  receive	  the	  funds.	  Thwarted	  by	  other	  Board	  Member’s	  wishes	  for	  different	  organizations	  to	  be	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  funds,	  she	  backed	  down	  and	  redirected	  her	  energies	  toward	  canvassing	  Board	  Members	  privately	  to	  support	  her	  cause.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing,	  that	  issue	  also	  remains	  unresolved.	  	  
	   23	  
The	  building	  was	  put	  on	  the	  market	  through	  a	  local	  broker	  in	  Harlem	  as	  a	  shell	  for	  $500,000.	  All	  the	  while,	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  was	  relentlessly	  declaring	  the	  need	  for	  an	  emergency	  demolition	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  to	  persistently	  fend	  off.	  The	  building	  was	  unquestionably	  structurally	  compromised,	  but	  it	  was	  well	  contained	  by	  a	  sidewalk	  shed	  and	  there	  was	  rapid	  movement	  towards	  a	  potential	  sale.	  Some	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  buildings	  openly	  shed	  their	  constituent	  parts	  and	  become	  a	  source	  of	  reasonable	  alarm	  for	  pedestrians	  as	  well	  as	  city	  officials.	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  quietly	  lurked	  and	  slowly	  imploded,	  but	  did	  not	  look	  like	  a	  source	  of	  imminent	  collapse.	  This	  is	  undoubtedly	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  no	  one	  complained	  for	  so	  long—it	  was	  sealed	  for	  as	  long	  as	  anyone	  could	  remember	  and	  seemed	  to	  be	  under	  someone’s	  control	  because	  of	  the	  sidewalk	  shed.	  Offering	  additional	  anonymity	  was	  that	  it	  faces	  several	  City	  College	  loading	  docks	  and	  there	  were	  other	  vacant	  buildings	  on	  the	  block.	  Even	  the	  Executive	  Director,	  who	  lives	  a	  few	  doors	  down,	  apparently	  never	  gave	  it	  a	  second	  thought	  until	  she	  realized	  she	  might	  be	  able	  to	  profit	  from	  her	  involvement	  with	  it.	  	  	  When	  the	  building	  was	  put	  on	  the	  market,	  seven	  potential	  buyers	  came	  forward	  immediately	  to	  make	  an	  offer.	  A	  couple	  of	  offers	  came	  in	  too	  low	  at	  around	  $300,000	  and	  other	  offers	  were	  more	  reasonable,	  coming	  in	  at	  around	  $450,000,	  but	  they	  were	  made	  by	  unscrupulous	  developers	  the	  Commission	  was	  aware	  of	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  risk	  the	  possible	  imminent	  problems	  they	  represented.	  Not	  long	  after	  the	  interest	  in	  the	  building	  seemed	  to	  have	  peaked,	  a	  full	  price	  offer	  was	  received	  from	  a	  couple	  from	  California	  who	  seemed	  to	  have	  the	  resources	  and	  a	  genuine	  interest	  in	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restoring	  the	  building.	  The	  sale	  of	  a	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  shell	  has	  significant	  limitations	  and	  time	  intensive	  expectations.	  The	  structural	  instability	  demands	  that	  a	  structural	  engineer	  be	  retained	  immediately	  to	  brace	  and	  shore	  the	  building	  to	  make	  it	  safe	  enough	  to	  assuage	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  and	  rescind	  the	  demolition	  order.	  Additionally,	  the	  buyer	  must	  have	  ready	  capital	  to	  infuse	  into	  the	  building’s	  purchase	  and	  restoration—there	  is	  no	  time	  to	  negotiate	  financing.	  Finally,	  it	  must	  be	  fully	  understood	  that	  the	  building	  is	  in	  a	  designated	  historic	  district	  and	  plans	  to	  add	  additions	  or	  alter	  the	  façade	  will	  be	  scrutinized.	  	  	  The	  offer	  from	  the	  California	  buyers	  was	  accepted	  with	  great	  anticipation	  and	  the	  Commission	  spent	  considerable	  time	  making	  certain	  they	  understood	  fully	  the	  need	  for	  expedience.	  Despite	  the	  preparatory	  efforts	  made	  to	  select	  a	  qualified	  and	  informed	  purchaser,	  the	  buyers	  did	  ultimately	  delay	  the	  process	  so	  much	  that	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  began	  threatening	  demolition	  again.	  After	  a	  couple	  of	  tense	  months,	  the	  project	  did	  finally	  commence	  and	  the	  building	  is	  now	  stabilized	  and	  no	  longer	  at	  risk	  for	  demolition.	  	  	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  is	  illustrative	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  in	  general	  and	  the	  specific	  cause	  of	  fragmented	  ownership.	  No	  successorship	  plan	  for	  the	  organization,	  a	  tireless	  opportunist,	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  who	  had	  no	  idea	  or	  did	  not	  remember	  they	  had	  any	  level	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  building	  are	  specific	  to	  this	  fragmented	  ownership	  profile.	  Despite	  the	  obstacles	  present	  with	  467	  West	  140th	  Street,	  the	  building	  was	  saved	  from	  demolition	  by	  being	  reported	  to	  the	  LPC,	  which	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subsequently	  untangled	  the	  ownership	  and	  was	  able	  to	  negotiate	  the	  need	  for	  selling	  the	  building	  without	  litigation,	  coordinated	  the	  sale,	  and	  now	  the	  building	  is	  being	  restored	  with	  its	  façade	  fundamentally	  intact.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  United	  States,	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  Hamilton	  
Heights	  Historic	  District	  Designation	  Report	  (New	  York:	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  1974),	  pg.	  #8,	  accessed	  May	  2013,	  http://www.neighborhoodpreservationcenter.org/db/bb_files/HAMILTON-­‐HGTS-­‐HD.pdf.	  2	  Ibid.,	  p.	  4.	  3	  Ibid.,	  p.	  7a.	  4	  Melba-­‐Joyce	  Bradford,	  Vocational	  Guidance	  and	  Workshop	  Center:	  Forty-­‐Second	  
Anniversary	  Celebration	  (New	  York:	  Harlem	  School	  of	  the	  Arts,	  1992),	  pg.	  #5.	  5	  Cathy	  Conners,	  "Hicks	  Suffers	  Another	  Devastating	  Robbery,"	  New	  York	  Amsterdam	  
News,	  September	  24,	  1988,	  accessed	  May	  9,	  2013,	  http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/226336253/13DEF2F95F471B47116/3?accountid=10226.	  6	  United	  States,	  Charities	  Bureau,	  New	  York	  State	  Office	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  A	  
Guide	  to	  Sales	  and	  Other	  Dispositions	  of	  Assets	  Pursuant	  to	  Not-­‐for-­‐Profit	  Corporation	  Law,	  Use	  of	  Proceeds,	  accessed	  May	  10,	  2013,	  http://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/sales.pdf.	  	  	   7	  The	  author	  was	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  intern	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  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  2012.	  Until	  May	  2013,	  I	  was	  personally	  involved	  with	  the	  case	  studies	  467	  West	  140th	  Street,	  28	  West	  130th	  Street,	  and	  865	  Sterling	  Place.  
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CASE	  STUDY	  TWO	  37	  East	  4th	  Street	  AKA:	  Skidmore	  House,	  New	  York,	  NY	  	  Status:	  Resolved	  	  Cause:	  Strategic	  
	  	  37	  East	  4th	  Street	  is	  a	  resolved	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  in	  the	  NoHo	  area	  of	  Lower	  Manhattan.	  Built	  circa	  1845	  as	  one	  of	  a	  grand	  block	  of	  townhouses	  on	  East	  4th	  Street,	  it	  is	  a	  three-­‐and-­‐a	  half	  story,	  brick	  Greek	  Revival-­‐style	  building.1	  Designated	  an	  Individual	  Landmark	  in	  1970,	  the	  designation	  report	  describes	  the	  house	  as	  “unusually	  impressive,”	  and	  one	  of	  only	  two	  houses	  of	  note	  that	  have	  survived	  on	  the	  once	  fashionable	  block.	  Its	  architectural	  and	  blood	  cousin,	  29	  East	  4th	  Street	  which	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Old	  Merchant’s	  House,	  was	  designated	  an	  Individual	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Landmark	  in	  1965.	  The	  two	  houses	  were	  built	  thirteen	  years	  apart	  and	  subsequently	  sold	  to	  cousins	  Seabury	  Tredwell	  and	  Samuel	  Skidmore.	  Although	  the	  two	  buildings	  are	  typically	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another	  as	  extant	  examples	  of	  Greek	  Revival	  architecture	  in	  a	  once	  thriving	  residential	  neighborhood,	  their	  trajectory	  into	  the	  future	  could	  not	  have	  been	  more	  disparate.	  As	  the	  Old	  Merchant’s	  House	  was	  celebrated	  as	  a	  perfectly	  intact	  example	  of	  the	  domestic	  world	  of	  a	  prosperous	  merchant,	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  sank	  into	  oblivion.	  The	  Skidmore	  House	  is	  described	  in	  the	  designation	  report	  as	  having	  “…traces	  of	  rustication…”,	  “…blocked-­‐up	  sidelights…”,	  “traces	  of	  delicate	  carved	  molding…”,	  and	  “vestiges	  of	  the	  cap	  molding.”	  The	  “handsome	  doorway	  with	  full	  entablature	  supported	  by	  a	  pair	  of	  Ionic	  columns”	  is	  the	  most	  lauded	  element	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  in	  the	  designation	  report	  and	  became	  the	  plaintive	  cry	  of	  the	  building’s	  devolution	  in	  later	  photographic	  documentation.2	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37	  East	  4th	  Street	  is	  a	  case	  study	  illustrating	  strategic	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  and	  it	  represents	  the	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  antecedent	  that	  is	  most	  often	  identified	  as	  the	  primary	  problem—the	  rapacious	  developer.	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  overrepresented	  as	  primarily	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  avaricious	  developer	  because	  the	  cases	  tend	  to	  be	  sensationalized	  in	  the	  media,	  producing	  a	  villain	  to	  loathe	  in	  a	  crisis	  situation,	  and	  galvanizing	  preservationists	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  This	  assemblage	  makes	  the	  strategic	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  owner	  profile	  interesting,	  but	  in	  reality	  it	  is	  the	  least	  common.	  	  	  	  Purchased	  in	  the	  1960s	  by	  New	  York	  based	  artists	  Lenore	  Tawney	  and	  Po	  Kim,	  the	  building	  functioned	  as	  an	  art	  gallery	  for	  emerging	  artists	  in	  the	  1970s	  called	  Touchstone	  under	  Barbara	  Hirschl	  and	  subsequently	  served	  as	  housing	  and	  studio	  space	  for	  artists	  into	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  In	  this	  bohemian	  world	  the	  Skidmore	  House's	  identity	  began	  to	  shift	  even	  further	  away	  from	  its	  roots	  as	  a	  mid-­‐19th-­‐century	  genteel	  home	  to	  a	  mid-­‐20th-­‐century	  counterculture	  outpost.	  Although	  the	  façade	  condition	  did	  not	  improve	  during	  their	  stewardship,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  it	  significantly	  or	  abruptly	  worsened	  either.	  The	  designation	  report	  indicates	  the	  owners	  hoped	  to	  restore	  the	  building;3	  a	  plan	  alluded	  to	  in	  a	  1978	  thesis	  on	  the	  Skidmore	  House,	  which	  included	  an	  interview	  with	  Po	  Kim.4	  	  In	  1988,	  everything	  changed	  for	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  following	  the	  death	  of	  real	  estate	  mogul	  Sol	  Goldman	  in	  October	  of	  1987.	  Goldman	  owned	  all	  of	  the	  property	  around	  the	  Skidmore	  House,	  but	  not	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  itself	  until	  his	  heirs	  bought	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it	  in	  1988	  immediately	  following	  his	  death.	  In	  that	  same	  year,	  the	  Goldman	  heirs	  demolished	  the	  buildings	  to	  the	  west	  and	  the	  east	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House.	  There	  was	  significant	  tumult	  within	  the	  Goldman	  family	  over	  the	  estate	  after	  his	  death	  and	  the	  widow	  and	  her	  children	  fought	  it	  out	  over	  his	  extensive	  portfolio,	  which	  included	  income-­‐producing	  real	  estate	  and	  real	  estate	  purchased	  to	  lie	  fallow	  until	  the	  development	  opportunity	  ripens.5	  Clearly	  the	  children,	  who	  are	  variously	  titled	  as	  officers	  of	  multiple	  layers	  of	  real	  estate	  entities,	  wanted	  to	  hasten	  the	  ripeness	  of	  East	  4th	  Street	  by	  demolishing	  all	  that	  they	  could.	  Because	  the	  demolition	  of	  Skidmore	  was	  thwarted	  by	  its	  Landmark	  designation,	  in	  December	  of	  1990	  the	  Goldman	  heirs	  requested	  the	  LPC	  write	  a	  report	  supporting	  issuance	  of	  a	  Special	  Permit	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  74-­‐711	  of	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Zoning	  Resolution	  which	  permits	  a	  change	  of	  bulk	  and	  use	  for	  a	  landmark	  building	  if	  the	  owner	  agrees	  to	  restore	  and	  maintain	  the	  landmark.	  In	  1991,	  Landmarks	  approved	  the	  Modification	  of	  Use	  application,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  acted	  upon.	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	  10.	  Skidmore	  House	  location	  within	  Goldman	  family	  property	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  Between	  1988,	  when	  the	  Goldman	  heirs	  purchased	  the	  property,	  and	  1994,	  the	  property	  took	  a	  nosedive.	  In	  1994	  a	  fire	  on	  the	  parlor	  floor	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  local	  press	  coverage	  about	  the	  now	  derelict	  building	  and	  the	  ire	  of	  preservationists	  gained	  momentum.	  Between	  1994	  and	  1998,	  there	  was	  considerable	  activity	  surrounding	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  ranging	  from	  advocacy	  groups	  declaring	  their	  indignation	  over	  the	  neglect	  of	  the	  building	  to	  the	  LPC	  demanding	  investigation	  and	  subsequent	  repair	  of	  the	  building.6	  	  	  In	  the	  early	  summer	  of	  2002,	  it	  was	  reported	  to	  the	  LPC	  that	  the	  roof	  had	  collapsed.	  It	  was	  also	  reported	  to	  the	  LPC	  in	  June	  of	  2002	  that	  a	  $40	  million	  deal	  for	  a	  hotel	  that	  would	  utilize	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  as	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  hotel	  also	  collapsed	  due	  to	  the	  City	  of	  New	  York	  use	  of	  the	  westerly	  neighboring	  lot	  as	  water	  tunnel	  access.	  Between	  the	  water	  tunnel	  and	  the	  designated	  buildings	  at	  29	  and	  37	  East	  Fourth	  Street,	  the	  Goldman	  heirs	  presumably	  had	  had	  enough	  with	  the	  city.	  	  	  In	  August	  of	  2002,	  the	  LPC	  initiated	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  Goldman	  Estate	  for	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House.	  The	  complaint	  reads:	  ...that	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  is	  bringing	  the	  action	  to	  compel	  the	  defendants	  to	  repair	  the	  building	  (Skidmore	  House)	  and	  maintain	  it	  in	  good	  repair	  as	  required	  under	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Law.	  Defendants	  have	  emptied	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  of	  tenants,	  have	  demolished	  the	  buildings	  on	  either	  side	  of	  it,	  have	  failed	  to	  maintain	  it	  for	  years	  despite	  repeated	  admonitions	  to	  do	  so	  from	  the	  NYC	  LPC	  and	  have	  neglected	  the	  building	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  its	  roof	  recently	  collapsed	  leaving	  the	  interior	  of	  the	  building	  exposed	  to	  the	  elements.	  The	  Skidmore	  House	  sits	  alone	  surrounded	  by	  empty	  lots	  in	  a	  prime	  development	  site	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  actions	  and	  is—either	  by	  design	  or	  disregard—in	  danger	  of	  further	  collapse	  as	  a	  result	  if	  the	  defendants	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continue	  to	  neglect	  it.	  It	  further	  states	  that	  the	  LPC	  is	  seeking	  injunctive	  relief	  against	  the	  owners,	  operators,	  lessees,	  and	  all	  other	  persons	  and	  entities	  claiming	  any	  right	  or	  interest	  in	  the	  Skidmore	  House;	  to	  enjoin	  defendants	  from	  allowing	  the	  landmark	  Skidmore	  House	  to	  continue	  to	  severely	  deteriorate;	  and	  to	  require	  defendants	  to	  repair,	  restore,	  and	  maintain	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  as	  required	  by	  Section	  25-­‐311	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Code.	  7	  	  The	  defendant	  is	  named	  as	  10-­‐12	  Cooper	  Square	  Incorporated	  with	  Allan	  Goldman	  listed	  as	  an	  owner	  and/or	  person	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House.	  The	  subject	  premises	  are	  further	  described	  as	  a	  designated	  NYC	  Landmark	  and	  as	  recognized	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  a	  place	  of	  significance	  through	  listing	  on	  the	  National	  Register	  of	  Historic	  Places.	  A	  chronology	  follows	  which	  describes	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  house	  under	  the	  defendants’	  ownership	  since	  their	  purchase	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  in	  1988.	  Most	  notably,	  it	  spells	  out	  that	  the	  building	  was	  vacant	  since	  1990,	  all	  of	  the	  surrounding	  buildings	  were	  demolished	  which	  structurally	  weakened	  the	  building	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  party	  walls	  were	  never	  designed	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  elements	  and	  exist	  in	  isolation,	  and	  it	  calls	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  owners	  attempted	  to	  utilize	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  for	  a	  Special	  Permit	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  74-­‐711	  of	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Zoning	  Resolution.	  Although	  the	  application	  was	  approved,	  no	  action	  was	  taken	  pursuant	  to	  the	  special	  permit.	  An	  exchange	  of	  admonitions,	  assurances,	  and	  stalling	  endured	  from	  1994	  until	  2002,	  the	  time	  of	  the	  complaint.	  In	  2002,	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  roof	  collapsed,	  the	  NYC	  DOB	  issued	  an	  Unsafe	  Building	  Notice	  due	  to	  the	  building’s	  roof	  collapse,	  the	  subsequent	  exposure	  of	  the	  interior	  to	  the	  elements,	  and	  a	  40-­‐foot	  long	  crack	  in	  the	  east	  wall	  of	  the	  building.8	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The	  Skidmore	  House	  legal	  action	  by	  the	  LPC	  was	  countered	  by	  the	  Goldmans.	  More	  typically	  once	  a	  lawsuit	  is	  filed,	  the	  owner	  realizes	  that	  the	  situation	  is	  dire	  and	  will	  take	  action	  to	  deal	  with	  or	  sell	  the	  property.	  However,	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  went	  to	  trial,	  the	  only	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  history	  with	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  The	  unprecedented	  nature	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  for	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  may	  explain	  why	  the	  owners	  were	  emboldened	  to	  take	  on	  the	  LPC	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  In	  the	  Post-­‐Trial	  brief,	  the	  attorney	  for	  the	  Goldmans	  countered	  the	  LPC	  Complaint	  with	  the	  following	  arguments:	  The	  Order	  to	  Show	  Cause	  had	  been	  mooted	  by	  the	  Owner’s	  full	  performance	  of	  the	  work	  for	  which	  the	  preliminary	  injunctive	  relief	  was	  sought,	  the	  complaint	  pleads	  the	  building	  is	  a	  designated	  New	  York	  City	  landmark	  and	  the	  relief	  is	  sought	  on	  that	  status,	  which	  the	  owner	  disputes,	  and	  that	  the	  Commission	  pleads	  they	  are	  seeking	  to	  enforce	  25-­‐311	  which	  states	  that	  every	  person	  in	  charge	  on	  a	  landmark	  site	  shall	  keep	  it	  in	  good	  repair,	  which	  the	  Owner’s	  attorney	  feels	  is	  unreasonable,	  subjective,	  and	  onerously	  unenforceable	  because	  it	  would	  demand	  constant	  intervention	  by	  the	  court.9	  	  The	  roof	  was	  replaced	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  two	  years	  it	  took	  the	  lawsuit	  to	  be	  decided.	  Following	  a	  dramatic	  collapse	  of	  a	  significant	  section	  that	  was	  once	  a	  large	  skylight,	  the	  roof	  collapse	  was	  the	  end	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  LPC	  and	  the	  Goldman	  family.	  However,	  as	  opposed	  by	  the	  Goldman’s	  attorney’s	  statement	  that	  roof	  replacement	  was	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  obligation	  to	  “repair”	  the	  building,	  the	  LPC's	  demands	  for	  good	  repair	  were	  much	  wider	  in	  scope,	  and	  included	  repair	  of	  decorative	  elements	  on	  the	  façade	  (see	  Appendix	  A).	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  designation	  was	  challenged	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  Commission	  failed	  procedurally	  by	  not	  voting	  on	  the	  matter	  during	  a	  public	  hearing	  held	  on	  February	  3,	  1970,	  and	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  requirement	  to	  give	  notice	  for	  the	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hearing	  on	  August	  18,	  1970	  during	  which	  the	  vote	  was	  presumably	  taken.	  The	  owner’s	  attorney	  argues	  that	  said	  failures	  are	  fatal	  to	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House.	  The	  Judge	  countered	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “long	  established	  presumption	  of	  regularity	  in	  that	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  no	  official	  or	  person	  acting	  under	  an	  oath	  of	  office	  will	  do	  anything	  contrary	  to	  his	  official	  duty…That	  presumption	  compels	  an	  adversary	  to	  come	  forward	  with	  affirmative	  evidence	  of	  unlawful	  or	  irregular	  conduct.	  Substantial	  evidence	  is	  required	  to	  overcome	  the	  presumption	  of	  legality.”10	  	  The	  judge	  found	  that	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  made	  “minimal	  repairs”	  since	  they	  acquired	  the	  property	  in	  1988,	  and	  that	  the	  current	  condition	  is	  “in	  a	  dismal	  state	  of	  disrepair.”	  It	  is	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  “Plaintiff	  (LPC)	  characterizes	  the	  defendants’	  conduct	  as	  ‘demolition	  by	  neglect.’“	  The	  Post-­‐Trial	  brief	  makes	  much	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  “good	  repair”	  and	  reads	  as	  endless	  tumult	  over	  the	  definition	  until	  Mark	  Silberman,	  LPC	  General	  Counsel,	  testified,	  “Section	  311	  requires	  owners	  maintain	  the	  exterior	  of	  their	  building	  and	  those	  portions	  of	  the	  interior	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  exterior	  in	  a	  state	  of	  good	  repairs	  to	  prevent	  deterioration	  and	  destruction	  of	  the	  resource	  that	  we	  are	  protecting,	  the	  building	  in	  this	  case.”	  He	  further	  testified,	  “All	  exterior	  architectural	  elements,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  purely	  decorative	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  are	  considered	  significant	  are	  also	  covered	  under	  Section	  311,	  and	  would	  have	  to	  be	  maintained.“11	  	  	  The	  court	  ultimately	  found	  that	  the	  building	  was	  currently	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disrepair,	  and	  that	  the	  repairs	  sought	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  were	  necessary	  to	  stabilize	  the	  Skidmore	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House,	  and	  bring	  it	  to	  a	  state	  of	  ‘good	  repair.’	  It	  is	  further	  acknowledged	  that	  "good	  repair”	  is	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  consistently	  uphold	  agency	  deference	  unless	  the	  determination	  is	  unreasonable	  or	  irrational.	  Although	  an	  unsatisfying	  response,	  it	  does	  stay	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  courts	  will	  be	  endlessly	  monitoring	  landmarked	  buildings.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  the	  owner’s	  attempted	  claim	  that	  disrepair	  was	  a	  grandfathered	  condition,	  due	  to	  the	  deterioration	  present	  at	  the	  time	  of	  designation,	  was	  also	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  “The	  photographs,	  which	  accompanied	  the	  original	  application	  for	  designation	  demonstrates	  the	  deterioration	  that	  the	  façade	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  has	  endured	  under	  the	  stewardship	  of	  the	  defendants.	  The	  repairs	  undertaken	  by	  the	  defendants	  have	  been	  simply	  inadequate	  to	  maintain	  the	  landmark	  in	  the	  state	  of	  repair	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  landmark	  designation.”12	  The	  façade	  was	  certainly	  in	  less	  than	  pristine	  condition	  based	  on	  the	  photos	  taken	  around	  the	  time	  of	  designation,	  however,	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  trial	  was	  reprehensible.	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  Figure	  11.	  Skidmore	  House	  2005.	  Photo	  courtesy	  LPC	  NYC.	  On	  December	  20,	  2004,	  the	  judge	  ordered	  the	  defendants	  to	  “permanently	  repair	  and	  restore	  the	  exterior	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  to	  a	  state	  of	  ‘good	  repair’,”	  to	  do	  so	  in	  an	  expeditious	  manner,	  and	  to	  keep	  it	  in	  “good	  repair”	  in	  perpetuity.13	  The	  Skidmore	  House	  was	  indeed	  repaired	  by	  the	  Goldmans,	  but	  not	  because	  they	  learned	  their	  lesson	  and	  realized	  their	  mistake	  in	  abusing	  a	  landmark.	  They	  restored	  it,	  as	  their	  attorney	  said,	  because,	  “…although	  this	  work	  was	  incredibly	  expensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming,	  the	  Owner	  was	  not	  forced	  to	  do	  so	  ‘kicking	  and	  screaming,’	  but	  did	  so	  to	  protect	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Building	  which,	  not	  coincidentally,	  was	  important	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to	  obtain	  the	  right	  to	  develop	  the	  surrounding	  property	  for	  residential	  purposes.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  insane	  for	  the	  Owner	  to	  have	  intentionally	  jeopardized	  its	  ability	  to	  obtain	  a	  variance	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  74-­‐711	  of	  the	  Zoning	  Resolution	  and	  as	  the	  Court	  noted,	  ‘We’re	  not	  dealing	  with	  the	  public.	  We’re	  dealing	  with	  people	  who	  are	  very	  sophisticated…’”14	  	  Following	  their	  success	  with	  obtaining	  their	  third	  approved	  74-­‐711	  Special	  Permit,	  which	  was	  obtained	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  99-­‐year	  lease	  with	  a	  developer	  independent	  of	  the	  Goldman	  family	  to	  ensure	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  once-­‐derelict	  Skidmore	  House	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  passively	  destroying	  a	  Landmark,	  there	  is	  now	  a	  15-­‐story	  residential	  tower	  on	  the	  corner	  of	  Bowery	  and	  East	  4th	  Street	  built	  with	  development	  rights	  from	  the	  now	  restored	  Skidmore	  House.	  and	  from	  the	  development	  rights	  retained	  from	  another	  99-­‐year	  lease	  with	  the	  City	  of	  New	  York	  for	  the	  vacant	  land	  west	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House.	  The	  owners	  agreed	  to	  the	  vacant	  lot	  being	  developed	  as	  a	  park	  after	  the	  water	  tunnel	  construction,	  on	  the	  condition	  they	  retained	  the	  development	  rights.	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  Fig.	  12.	  Skidmore	  House	  2010	  with	  adjacent	  tower.	  Photograph	  courtesy	  Chester	  Higgins	  Jr.	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  	  Resolution	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  through	  a	  tortuous	  20-­‐year-­‐long	  process	  that	  ultimately	  required	  a	  lawsuit	  and	  a	  third	  zoning	  special	  permit.	  The	  Special	  Permit	  is	  described	  as	  “…ZR	  §74-­‐711	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  modify	  many	  sections	  of	  the	  Zoning	  Resolution	  in	  order	  to	  make	  owning	  and	  maintaining	  historic	  structures	  less	  burdensome	  and	  more	  desirable.	  In	  return	  for	  waiver(s),	  applicants	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  subject	  property	  is	  properly	  rehabilitated	  and	  maintained	  in	  
	   38	  
perpetuity.”15	  The	  process	  was	  frustrating,	  although	  the	  goals	  of	  all	  parties	  were	  ultimately	  met.	  It	  remains	  unclear	  to	  me	  what	  motivated	  the	  Goldman	  family	  to	  spend	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  money	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  place	  they	  started	  in	  1990.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  as	  simple	  as	  arrogance,	  overconfidence	  in	  their	  anticipated	  result	  of	  the	  LPC	  lawsuit,	  and	  utter	  disregard	  for	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  as	  anything	  more	  than	  a	  leveraging	  tool	  for	  a	  zoning	  variance.	  Today	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  has	  been	  restored	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  original	  material	  and	  cement-­‐based	  cast	  stone	  and	  is	  a	  ten-­‐unit	  rental	  building.	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  LPC	  documentation	  and	  discussions	  with	  Mr.	  Weiss.	  7	  City	  of	  New	  York	  v.	  10-­‐12	  Cooper	  Square,	  Inc.,	  793	  N.Y.S.2d	  688,	  692	  (N.Y.	  	  Sup.	  Ct.	  2004) 	   8	  NYC	  DOB	  BIS	  061102UB1014/02.	  Violation	  06/11/2002	  UB-­‐Unsafe	  Building	  	  	   9	  City	  of	  New	  York	  v.	  10-­‐12	  Cooper	  Square,	  Inc.,	  793	  N.Y.S.2d	  688,	  692	  (N.Y.	  	  Sup.	  Ct.	  2004) 	  	   10	  Ibid	  	   11	  Ibid	  	   12	  Ibid	  	   13	  Ibid	  	   14	  Ibid	  	   15	  Scott	  Stringer,	  Recommendation	  on	  ULURP	  Application	  No.	  C	  060525	  ZSM-­‐-­‐Skidmore	  House	  by	  Atlantic	  Realty,	  December	  18,	  2007,	  Borough	  President,	  Borough	  of	  Manhattan.	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CASE	  STUDY	  THREE	  135	  Joralemon	  Street,	  Brooklyn,	  NY	  	  Status:	  Resolved	  	  Cause:	  Mental	  Illness/Inheritance	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  is	  an	  1833	  wood-­‐frame	  house	  located	  in	  Brooklyn	  Heights.	  It	  stands	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Brooklyn	  Heights	  Historic	  District,	  the	  first	  historic	  district	  designation	  of	  the	  nascent	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  in	  November	  of	  1965.	  Otis	  Pearsall,	  then	  Co-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  Historic	  Preservation	  Committee	  of	  the	  Brooklyn	  Heights	  Association	  testified,	  “Of	  the	  1284	  buildings	  fronting	  on	  the	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streets	  within	  the	  proposed	  historic	  district,	  at	  least	  684	  were	  built	  before	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  at	  least	  1,078	  before	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century…”	  1	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  and	  its	  opposite-­‐hand-­‐plan	  sister	  building	  at	  24	  Middagh	  Street,	  are	  both	  pre-­‐Civil	  War	  buildings	  that	  retained	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  original	  architectural	  detail,	  until	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  began	  to	  falter	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  
	  	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  is	  one	  of	  three	  properties	  in	  the	  Brooklyn	  Heights	  Historic	  District	  that	  were	  inherited	  by	  an	  only	  child.	  Largely	  unable	  to	  handle	  the	  complexities	  of	  property	  ownership	  and	  maintenance,	  all	  of	  his	  properties	  fell	  into	  disrepair.	  14	  Hunts	  Lane	  was	  the	  first	  of	  his	  properties	  to	  be	  investigated	  by	  the	  LPC	  in	  2001.	  The	  owner	  chose	  to	  sell	  that	  building	  rather	  than	  make	  repairs	  following	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pressure	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  tend	  to	  the	  property.	  In	  2003,	  the	  poor	  condition	  of	  135	  Joralemon	  and	  subsequent	  dismay	  from	  the	  neighborhood	  and	  community	  groups	  resulted	  in	  renewed	  efforts	  by	  the	  Commission	  to	  compel	  the	  owner	  to	  bring	  135	  Joralemon	  to	  a	  state	  of	  good	  repair.2	  	  
	  Figure	  16.	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  October	  2004.	  Pre-­‐fire.	  Photograph	  courtesy	  LPC	  NYC	  	  The	  owner	  was	  anecdotally	  referred	  to	  as	  crazy,	  cantankerous	  or	  eccentric.	  Local	  Brooklyn	  newspapers	  referred	  to	  the	  building	  as	  haunted	  and	  referenced	  a	  Time	  Out	  
New	  York	  article	  described	  it	  as	  one	  of	  the	  13	  creepiest	  places	  in	  the	  city,	  “It’s	  easy	  to	  picture	  Uncle	  Fester	  roaming	  the	  attic,	  testing	  light	  bulbs	  in	  his	  mouth	  —	  or	  Jeffrey	  Dahmer	  in	  the	  basement,	  dismembering	  corpses.”3	  In	  reality,	  the	  Commission	  discovered	  upon	  dealing	  with	  him	  for	  several	  years	  that	  he	  actually	  fell	  somewhere	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more	  mundane-­‐-­‐a	  penurious	  man	  with	  Collyer	  Brother’s	  Syndrome,	  a	  form	  of	  compulsive	  hoarding.	  He	  lived	  in	  the	  house	  at	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  with	  his	  longtime	  companion	  for	  several	  years	  into	  the	  property’s	  demise,	  until	  the	  house	  sustained	  a	  fire	  on	  New	  Year’s	  Eve	  in	  2004,	  which	  forced	  them	  to	  move	  into	  another	  property	  at	  16	  Hunts	  Lane.4	  The	  conditions	  discovered	  by	  the	  Fire	  Department	  testify	  to	  the	  severity	  of	  Collyer	  Brother’s	  syndrome	  and	  its	  consequences.	  Barely	  able	  to	  enter	  the	  burning	  house	  due	  to	  the	  detritus	  packed	  inside,	  a	  post-­‐fire	  image	  taken	  of	  the	  rear	  of	  the	  building	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  2006	  epitomizes	  Collyer	  Brothers	  Syndrome.	  
	  Figure	  17.	  135	  Joralemon	  Street,	  rear	  façade	  post-­‐fire	  2005.	  Photo	  courtesy	  LPC	  NYC	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Named	  for	  the	  Collyer	  Brothers	  of	  Harlem,	  as	  previously	  stated,	  Collyer	  Brothers	  Syndrome	  is	  the	  medical	  term	  for	  what	  is	  now	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  hoarding.	  Unfortunately,	  with	  the	  publicity	  of	  a	  successful	  television	  show	  of	  the	  same	  name,	  hoarding	  is	  the	  psychological	  syndrome	  du	  jour	  that	  the	  public	  consumes	  with	  voracity.	  However,	  the	  effects	  are	  devastating	  and	  have	  real	  consequences.	  The	  following	  grainy	  1947	  New	  York	  Times	  photograph	  illustrates	  hoarding	  conditions	  as	  seen	  at	  the	  Collyer	  Brothers	  residence:	  	  
	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  collision	  or	  juncture	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  with	  a	  problem	  seemingly	  much	  larger	  than	  preservation	  emerges	  in	  the	  case	  study	  of	  135	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Joralemon	  Street.	  After	  the	  fire	  and	  following	  repeated	  requests	  to	  initiate	  repairs	  to	  the	  building,	  the	  LPC	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  owner	  in	  October	  2005	  stating:	  Over	  nine	  months	  have	  elapsed	  since	  the	  fire.	  As	  you	  know,	  you	  are	  required	  by	  law	  to	  maintain	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  in	  good	  repair.	  I	  have	  previously	  written	  you	  about	  this	  and	  have	  met	  with	  you.	  I	  appreciate	  that	  you	  took	  me	  through	  the	  house.	  However,	  at	  this	  time	  your	  house	  at	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  remains	  in	  poor	  condition.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  vacant	  which	  makes	  it	  susceptible	  to	  further	  damage	  in	  light	  of	  its	  current	  poor	  condition;	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  of	  mold,	  water	  leaks,	  vandalism	  or	  even	  another	  fire.	  I	  am	  sorry	  to	  have	  to	  tell	  you	  this	  but	  at	  this	  time	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  has	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  initiate	  legal	  action	  to	  compel	  you	  to	  make	  the	  repairs	  to	  the	  house.5	  	  	  Said	  legal	  action	  was	  initiated	  on	  January	  6,	  2006	  including	  the	  following	  description	  of	  the	  building	  in	  the	  Order	  to	  Show	  Cause:	  	   …significant	  architectural	  features	  of	  the	  Subject	  Premises	  are	  in	  a	  state	  of	  significant	  deterioration	  or	  disrepair.	  Among	  other	  things,	  many	  of	  the	  front	  windows	  have	  been	  damaged	  or	  destroyed,	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  front	  door	  surround	  is	  missing,	  two	  sections	  of	  wood	  cornices	  on	  the	  front	  façade	  are	  visibly	  rotted	  and	  deteriorated,	  wooden	  front	  steps	  are	  deteriorated	  and	  missing	  a	  riser,	  portions	  of	  the	  front	  porch	  are	  rotted,	  a	  rear	  porch	  is	  significantly	  deteriorated	  and	  may	  be	  near	  collapse,	  rear	  windows	  have	  been	  destroyed,	  sections	  of	  wooden	  clapboard	  are	  rotted,	  and	  there	  is	  interior	  fire	  damage	  to	  the	  house.6	  (see	  Figure	  19)	  	  	  The	  owner	  ultimately	  sold	  the	  house	  in	  response	  to	  the	  lawsuit,	  despite	  having	  the	  funds	  available	  to	  him	  from	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  sale	  at	  14	  Hunts	  Lane	  to	  repair	  the	  building.	  The	  building	  was	  purchased	  by	  a	  local	  developer	  and	  restored	  close	  to	  the	  condition	  at	  designation	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  omitting	  the	  shutters	  that	  would	  have	  been	  original	  to	  the	  house	  and	  were	  present	  at	  designation.	  (see	  Figure	  20)	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  Figure	  19.	  135	  Joralemon	  Street,	  2006.	  Photograph	  courtesy	  LPC	  NYC	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  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  is	  a	  case	  study	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  that	  involves	  the	  paired	  causes	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  inheritance.	  It	  is	  also	  illustrative	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  maturation	  in	  terms	  of	  enforcing	  good	  repair.	  Today,	  with	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  case	  load	  and	  the	  need	  to	  triage	  buildings	  in	  terms	  of	  structural	  instability,	  which	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  public	  health	  and	  safety,	  135	  Joralemon	  Street	  would	  likely	  be	  categorized	  as	  failure	  to	  maintain	  rather	  than	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  Although	  if	  left	  unchecked,	  Joralemon	  would	  likely	  have	  progressed	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  there	  are	  numerous	  buildings	  on	  the	  precipice	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  that	  are	  not	  provided	  the	  attention	  Joralemon	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received	  due	  to	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  buildings	  that	  do	  meet	  the	  standard	  and	  the	  vast	  resources	  that	  must	  be	  marshaled	  to	  contain	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1	  United	  States,	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  Brooklyn	  
Heights	  Historic	  District,	  Borough	  of	  Brooklyn	  Designation	  Report	  (New	  York:	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  1965),	  pg.	  #3,	  accessed	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  2013,	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  John	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  Weiss,	  meeting	  with	  author,	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  Christie	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CASE	  STUDY	  FOUR	  	  West	  130th	  Street,	  New	  York,	  NY	  	  Cause:	  City	  Auction/Lack	  of	  Resources	  	  Status:	  In	  Process/Unknown	  	  
	  	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  is	  an	  Individual	  Landmark	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  in	  Harlem’s	  Astor	  Row.	  Built	  from	  1882-­‐1883,	  it	  was	  designated	  in	  1981	  as	  one	  of	  28	  nearly	  identical	  residences	  built	  as	  speculative	  housing	  under	  the	  ownership	  of	  William	  Astor.1	  According	  to	  the	  designation	  report,	  Astor	  Row	  was	  constructed	  in	  three	  groups	  with	  the	  first	  eight	  designed	  by	  architect	  Charles	  Buek.2	  The	  second	  group,	  to	  which	  No.	  28	  belongs,	  were	  constructed	  without	  the	  architect,	  but	  based	  on	  his	  design	  concept.	  The	  difference	  lies	  primarily	  in	  the	  massing,	  as	  the	  first	  eight	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are	  freestanding	  pairs,	  and	  the	  remaining	  twenty	  are	  a	  continuous	  row	  with	  deep	  recesses	  between	  pairs.	  Their	  most	  unique	  features	  include	  the	  small	  front	  yards	  and	  the	  wide	  wooden	  porches	  that	  run	  the	  full	  width	  of	  the	  building.	  The	  subject	  of	  this	  case	  study,	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  is	  described	  as	  follows	  in	  the	  designation	  report,	  “No.	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  has	  been	  completely	  sealed	  with	  cement	  blocks.	  The	  porch	  is	  still	  extant	  with	  most	  of	  its	  Eastlake	  spindles	  and	  details	  intact.	  The	  fence	  surrounding	  the	  yard	  is	  a	  modern	  one”.	  3	  
	  	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  has	  been	  suspended	  in	  deteriorated	  condition	  on	  Astor	  Row	  for	  over	  thirty	  years.	  The	  City	  seized	  it	  in	  1977	  as	  a	  tax-­‐lien	  foreclosure	  and	  sold	  it	  at	  auction	  in	  1986,	  five	  years	  after	  designation.	  Purchased	  by	  a	  woman	  and	  her	  mother	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(now	  deceased)	  at	  auction	  for	  $21,000,	  it	  represented	  a	  dream	  of	  returning	  to	  Harlem,	  where	  they	  once	  lived	  together	  as	  a	  family.	  Although	  the	  deed	  specifically	  states	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  sale	  of	  City-­‐owned	  residential	  buildings	  is	  to	  “stabilize	  and	  revitalize	  its	  neighborhoods	  through	  homeownership”	  and	  “limits	  the	  sale	  of	  designated	  City-­‐owned	  residential	  properties	  to	  those	  individuals	  who	  agree	  to	  live	  in	  the	  building	  for	  at	  least	  three	  years	  after	  completion	  of	  rehabilitation,”	  none	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  conditions	  have	  been	  met,	  let	  alone	  the	  LPC's	  requirement	  that	  the	  building	  be	  kept	  weather-­‐tight	  and	  in	  good	  repair.	  Twenty-­‐seven	  years	  after	  purchasing	  28	  West	  130th	  Street,	  the	  building's	  condition	  is	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  photographs:	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  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2012,	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  LPC	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  call	  from	  a	  neighbor	  who	  was	  using	  aerial-­‐view	  software	  to	  look	  at	  his	  own	  roof,	  and	  noticed	  the	  enormous	  hole	  in	  a	  neighboring	  roof,	  reporting	  it	  to	  the	  LPC.	  	  The	  agreement	  between	  the	  NYC	  Housing	  Preservation	  and	  Development	  Agency	  and	  the	  owner	  states	  that	  within	  two	  years	  of	  purchase,	  she	  must	  undertake	  and	  complete	  all	  rehabilitation/repairs	  in	  a	  “diligent	  manner,”	  and	  it	  specifically	  references	  the	  property’s	  Landmark	  status.	  As	  of	  the	  date	  of	  this	  writing,	  the	  owner	  has	  done	  nothing	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  HPD	  to	  rehabilitate,	  let	  alone	  reside	  in	  the	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building	  at	  28	  West	  130th	  Street.	  	  In	  addition,	  	  she	  is	  struggling	  mightily	  to	  meet	  the	  current	  demands	  of	  the	  LPC	  and	  subsequently	  the	  DOB	  that	  she	  stabilize	  the	  building.	  	  	  	  What	  is	  most	  significant	  about	  the	  municipal	  alphabet	  soup	  the	  owner	  is	  engulfed	  by	  is	  that	  the	  agency	  that	  took	  action	  is	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission.	  It	  appears	  HPD	  does	  not	  enforce	  the	  covenants	  of	  sales	  through	  City	  auction	  based	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  experience	  with	  buildings	  sold	  through	  auction	  that	  ultimately	  present	  as	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing,	  no	  response	  to	  requests	  for	  explanation	  of	  HPD’s	  policy	  on	  auction	  sale	  covenants	  has	  been	  received.	  The	  single	  DOB	  complaint	  issued	  against	  the	  building	  is	  about	  the	  porch	  wood	  being	  rotted,	  for	  which	  a	  failure	  to	  maintain	  porch	  violation	  was	  issued.	  Presumably	  DOB	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  building	  is	  vacant	  because	  it	  is	  sealed	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  unsound	  from	  the	  street.	  	  	  Despite	  pressure	  and	  guidance	  from	  Landmarks	  on	  stabilizing	  the	  building,	  the	  owner	  has	  done	  little	  more	  than	  equivocate	  enthusiastically.	  For	  eight	  months,	  she	  has	  been	  declaring	  herself	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  funding	  the	  stabilization,	  but	  her	  inability	  to	  obtain	  a	  loan	  for	  the	  work	  is	  reveal	  her	  suspected	  financial	  instability.	  When	  asked	  why	  she	  let	  the	  building	  continue	  to	  fall	  into	  ruin,	  her	  response	  was,	  “Sometimes	  it	  just	  gets	  away	  from	  you…”4	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  LPC	  has	  little	  recourse	  but	  to	  initiate	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  owner	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  and	  fines.	  It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  fining	  an	  impecunious	  woman	  is	  unproductive	  and	  a	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lawsuit	  is	  an	  oblique	  way	  to	  force	  her	  to	  sell.	  However,	  at	  present	  there	  are	  no	  alternative	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  to	  handle	  individuals	  like	  the	  owner	  of	  28	  West	  130th	  Street.	  With	  any	  luck,	  the	  Commission	  can	  persuade	  her	  to	  sell	  instead	  of	  threatening	  her,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution	  to	  this	  very	  common	  underlying	  cause	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect:	  lack	  of	  resources.	  	  	  Negotiating	  issues	  of	  insufficient	  funds	  in	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  tricky	  and	  extremely	  sensitive.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  defies	  the	  commonly	  held	  belief	  that	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  mostly	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rapacious	  developer.	  Lawsuits	  and	  fines	  are	  effective	  tools	  to	  de-­‐incentivize	  people	  with	  assets	  to	  lose,	  but	  when	  they	  have	  little	  to	  lose,	  it	  is	  just	  one	  more	  insurmountable	  nightmare.	  	  Secondly,	  poverty	  is	  a	  dreary	  problem	  that	  does	  not	  blend	  well	  with	  the	  crisis	  and	  outrage	  mentality	  so	  persistent	  in	  the	  preservation	  community.	  Third,	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  mechanism	  for	  lending	  in	  the	  form	  of	  loans	  or	  liens	  to	  at	  least	  stabilize	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  buildings.	  	  	  City	  auctions	  attracting	  unprepared	  buyers	  with	  ill-­‐conceived	  dreams	  is	  another	  consistent	  theme	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  and	  one	  that	  should	  be	  tempered	  by	  proof	  that	  the	  individual	  purchasing	  actually	  has	  the	  means	  to	  follow	  the	  project	  through	  to	  completion.	  Of	  no	  additional	  help	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  HPD	  does	  not	  enforce	  the	  terms	  of	  sale	  at	  city	  auction.	  The	  LPC	  being	  forced	  to	  pick	  up	  ten	  or	  twenty	  years	  later	  where	  another	  city	  agency	  was	  remiss	  in	  qualifying	  prospective	  owners	  is	  circular	  and	  silly.	  The	  history	  of	  city	  auction	  caused	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  has	  a	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preponderance	  that	  is	  worthy	  of	  careful	  evaluation	  and	  reconsideration	  of	  this	  practice.	  	  	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  owner	  is	  struggling	  to	  qualify	  for	  a	  loan	  just	  to	  stabilize	  the	  building.	  Even	  if	  she	  receives	  the	  money	  to	  stabilize,	  she	  is	  nowhere	  near	  being	  able	  to	  actually	  inhabit	  the	  building.	  28	  West	  130th	  Street	  is	  a	  literal	  and	  figurative	  abyss	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  model	  for	  expanding	  our	  approach	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1United	  States,	  New	  York	  City	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  28	  West	  130th	  
Street	  House	  (Part	  of	  Astor	  Row)	  Designation	  Report	  (New	  York:	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  1981),	  pg.	  #1,	  accessed	  May	  1,	  2013,	  http://www.neighborhoodpreservationcenter.org/db/bb_files/1981-­‐28W130thStreetHouse-­‐-­‐PartofAstorRow-­‐.pdf.	  2	  Ibid.,	  p.	  4	  3	  Ibid.,	  p.	  7	  	   4	  Quote	  from	  the	  owner	  at	  a	  meeting	  regarding	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  house	  that	  was	  attended	  by	  the	  author.	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CASE	  STUDY	  FIVE	  	  865	  Sterling	  Place,	  Brooklyn,	  NY	  	  Status:	  In	  Process/Unknown	  	  Cause:	  Mortgage	  Fraud	  	  
	  	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  is	  an	  unresolved,	  recent	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  building	  in	  the	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  II	  Historic	  District	  in	  Brooklyn.	  Built	  in	  1896	  as	  one	  of	  seven	  two-­‐family	  residences,	  it	  is	  a	  modest	  building	  that	  was	  sealed	  with	  masonry	  at	  the	  lower	  level	  and	  boarded	  up	  at	  the	  first	  and	  second	  stories	  at	  designation	  in	  2011.1	  Abandoned	  for	  years,	  the	  building	  has	  barely	  managed	  to	  survive	  into	  the	  21st	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century	  raped	  by	  mortgage	  fraud,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  abandonment	  perils	  of	  squatting	  and	  fire.	  	  
	  	  	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  beginning	  to	  intersect	  with	  mortgage	  fraud	  as	  crooked	  deed	  and	  mortgage	  transfers	  leave	  the	  buildings	  deteriorating	  as	  collateral	  damage.	  Mortgage	  fraud	  began	  to	  wreak	  havoc	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  subprime	  lending,	  so	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  actual	  buildings	  started	  roughly	  ten	  years	  ago.	  It	  takes	  time	  for	  a	  building	  to	  read	  as	  deteriorating	  in	  terms	  of	  loss	  of	  architectural	  features,	  structural	  instability	  felt	  by	  neighboring	  buildings,	  or	  through	  a	  compromised	  roof.	  Building	  deterioration	  is	  a	  slow	  and	  stealthy	  process	  that	  typically	  needs	  about	  ten	  years	  of	  complete	  disregard	  before	  it	  can	  be	  declared	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  865	  
	   58	  
Sterling	  Place	  had	  the	  process	  of	  reaching	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  hastened	  by	  a	  major	  fire	  in	  2009,	  which	  left	  it	  structurally	  compromised	  and	  exposed	  to	  the	  elements.	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The	  collision	  of	  mortgage	  fraud,	  preservation,	  and	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  complex	  and	  can	  be	  overwhelming.	  However,	  the	  problem	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  cannot	  be	  overestimated	  as	  two	  disparate	  realities—subprime	  lending	  that	  encourages	  fraud	  and	  increased	  designation	  in	  economically	  distressed	  areas—collide	  to	  create	  a	  heretofore	  unknown	  miasma.	  Mortgage	  fraud	  accounts	  for	  about	  one	  third	  of	  building	  abandonment	  in	  the	  current	  Crown	  Heights	  Historic	  Districts.2	  Calendaring	  of	  a	  third	  extension	  and	  proposal	  for	  a	  fourth	  will	  result	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  buildings	  affected	  by	  mortgage	  fraud	  to	  spiral.	  Similar	  results	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  adjacent	  Bedford-­‐Stuyvesant	  neighborhood	  is	  increasingly	  designated.	  	  	  Designation	  of	  areas	  of	  Central	  Brooklyn	  has	  significantly	  increased,	  running	  parallel	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  fraud.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  false	  correlation.	  The	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  Association,	  a	  small	  neighborhood	  advocacy	  organization	  presided	  by	  Ethel	  Tyus,	  has	  been	  driven	  to	  press	  for	  designation	  of	  Crown	  Heights	  since	  2006.	  Utilizing	  a	  preliminary	  proposed	  LPC	  district	  map	  from	  1978	  that	  included	  990	  buildings,	  Ethel	  Tyus	  and	  her	  organization	  pushed	  for	  designation.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  a	  Crown	  Heights	  III	  and	  IV	  are	  approved,	  almost	  the	  entire	  original	  proposed	  district	  will	  be	  a	  reality.	  The	  community	  impetus	  for	  designation	  was	  twofold—first	  it	  reflects	  an	  old	  desire	  to	  mediate	  development	  and	  gentrification	  and	  secondly,	  and	  most	  significantly,	  the	  neighborhood	  wanted	  the	  perceived	  power	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  to	  help	  them	  address	  abandoned	  buildings.	  When	  I	  first	  met	  Ethel	  Tyus	  in	  November	  of	  2012	  and	  asked	  her	  straightaway	  why	  she	  wanted	  the	  neighborhood	  to	  be	  designated,	  her	  response	  was,	  “25-­‐311.”3	  The	  significance	  of	  her	  answer	  is	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very	  important.	  25-­‐311	  refers	  to	  the	  Section	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  that	  regulates	  good	  repair	  and	  by	  extrapolation,	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  The	  import	  of	  a	  community	  advocate	  inductively	  utilizing	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  should	  not	  be	  disparaged.	  In	  one	  short	  numerical	  answer,	  Ethel	  Tyus	  encapsulated	  and	  reified	  the	  maturation	  of	  preservation	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  Commission	  as	  a	  concrete	  solution.	  	  	  Ethel	  Tyus	  lives	  on	  Sterling	  Place,	  a	  block	  of	  the	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  II	  Historic	  District	  that	  is	  overwhelmed	  by	  abandoned	  buildings.	  The	  north	  side	  of	  the	  block,	  where	  she	  resides,	  bears	  three	  buildings	  crippled	  by	  mortgage	  fraud.	  Two	  of	  the	  buildings	  (885	  and	  905	  Sterling	  Place)	  are	  the	  collateral	  damage	  of	  a	  particularly	  virulent	  perpetrator	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  in	  Brooklyn.	  Although	  he	  was	  imprisoned	  in	  2008	  following	  a	  salacious	  trial	  during	  which	  he	  claimed	  to	  be	  beholden	  to	  God	  alone,	  resolution	  of	  his	  crimes	  is	  incomplete	  as	  the	  buildings	  he	  targeted	  quietly	  descend	  into	  perdition.4	  The	  third	  building	  is	  865	  Sterling	  Place,	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  case	  study.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  865	  Sterling	  is	  the	  only	  mortgage	  fraud	  building	  in	  Crown	  Heights	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  writing	  to	  meet	  the	  Commission’s	  definition	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  Unless	  the	  other	  buildings	  are	  saved	  from	  their	  spiral	  into	  further	  deterioration	  through	  short	  sale	  or	  a	  similar	  tool	  that	  liberates	  the	  building	  from	  foreclosure,	  they	  will	  present	  as	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  within	  five	  years	  or	  so.	  	  	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  has	  endured	  years	  of	  fraudulent	  transactions	  spanning	  over	  a	  decade.	  The	  following	  is	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  ACRIS	  (Automated	  City	  Record	  Information	  System)	  property	  transaction	  records	  for	  the	  City	  of	  New	  York	  unless	  
	   61	  
otherwise	  footnoted:	  In	  1999,	  the	  last	  person	  to	  own	  the	  property	  for	  purposes	  of	  residency	  as	  opposed	  to	  fraud	  sold	  it	  to	  her	  nephew.	  He	  took	  out	  a	  mortgage	  on	  the	  property	  the	  same	  day	  the	  deed	  was	  transferred	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $130,000	  through	  WMC	  Mortgage	  Corporation,	  a	  now	  defunct	  arm	  of	  General	  Electric	  Capital	  Corporation.	  WMC	  is	  currently	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  involving	  "material	  and	  adverse"	  breaches	  of	  information	  that	  caused	  over	  $500	  million	  dollars	  in	  damages.5	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  mortgage	  was	  assigned	  to	  Nationscredit	  Home	  Equity	  Services	  Corporation,	  a	  lending	  branch	  of	  Bank	  of	  America	  that	  had	  a	  history	  of	  predatory	  lending	  and	  is	  now	  also	  defunct.	  One	  year	  later,	  a	  satisfaction	  of	  mortgage	  was	  filed.	  Two	  weeks	  later,	  the	  nephew	  transferred	  the	  deed	  to	  Home	  Relocators	  Incorporation;	  a	  business	  located	  in	  another	  abandoned	  building	  in	  Crown	  Heights	  about	  four	  blocks	  from	  the	  subject	  property.	  The	  same	  day,	  Home	  Relocators	  transferred	  the	  deed	  to	  a	  Barbara	  Rhoden	  and	  she	  in	  turn,	  on	  the	  same	  day,	  took	  out	  a	  mortgage	  on	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $292,000	  through	  D	  &	  M	  Financial	  Corporation.	  D	  &	  M	  Financial	  is	  another	  defunct	  subprime	  lender	  that	  was	  sued	  by	  EMC	  Mortgage	  in	  2005,	  a	  subprime	  entity	  of	  JPMorgan	  Chase	  for	  breach	  of	  contract.	  Six	  weeks	  later,	  in	  December	  of	  2002,	  Barbara	  Rhoden	  sold	  the	  deed	  to	  Anthony	  Reid,	  a	  presumed	  relative	  who	  held	  on	  to	  the	  deed	  until	  2005.	  	  	  In	  2003,	  however,	  Barbara	  Rhoden	  took	  out	  a	  $360,000	  mortgage	  on	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  through	  Argent	  Mortgage	  Property,	  LLC	  despite	  the	  fact	  she	  no	  longer	  owned	  it.	  Argent	  Mortgage	  assigned	  the	  mortgage	  to	  Ameriquest	  Mortgage	  in	  November	  of	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2004.	  Argent	  and	  Ameriquest	  were	  part	  of	  ACC	  Capital	  Holdings,	  an	  enormous	  subprime	  lender	  that	  was	  forced	  to	  shut	  down	  most	  of	  its	  lending	  arms	  in	  2006.	  	  Anthony	  Reid	  transferred	  the	  deed	  to	  177D	  Realty	  Incorporated	  for	  $20,000	  in	  2005.	  177D	  Realty	  had	  a	  business	  address	  of	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  deed	  transfer,	  the	  same	  address	  declared	  by	  Reid	  as	  his	  home	  address	  and	  the	  address	  of	  this	  case	  study.	  Four	  months	  later,	  in	  2006,	  the	  deed	  was	  sold	  by	  177D	  Realty	  to	  Lionel	  Noel	  for	  $750,000.	  The	  same	  day	  Lionel	  Noel	  took	  out	  two	  piggyback	  mortgages	  via	  MERS,	  in	  the	  amounts	  of	  $600,000	  and	  $150,000	  to	  fully	  finance	  the	  $750,000	  deed	  transaction.	  Nine	  months	  later,	  Lionel	  Noel	  sold	  the	  deed	  to	  Owen	  Lewis,	  a	  Brooklyn	  man	  now	  known	  to	  have	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  identity	  theft	  following	  a	  foreclosure	  on	  another	  Brooklyn	  property	  he	  never	  actually	  owned.	  	  	  Owen	  Lewis	  is	  recorded	  as	  taking	  out	  two	  mortgages	  in	  the	  amounts	  of	  $170,000	  and	  $680,000	  on	  November	  15,	  2006.	  Two	  weeks	  later,	  Lionel	  Noel	  satisfied	  both	  mortgages	  he	  took	  out	  in	  January	  of	  2006.	  In	  2008,	  the	  property	  was	  seized,	  presumably	  through	  foreclosure	  actions	  with	  Deutsche	  Bank	  as	  trustee.	  The	  recorded	  chain	  of	  transactions	  in	  ACRIS	  stops	  at	  this	  date.	  	  	  	  The	  fraudulent	  mortgages	  are	  manifested	  physically	  in	  865	  Sterling	  Place	  as	  a	  building	  succumbing	  to	  all	  imaginable	  social	  ills.	  A	  June	  2007	  Daily	  News	  article	  reports	  on	  an	  operation	  called	  Operation	  Crown	  Strike,	  a	  narcotics	  sting	  aimed	  squarely	  at	  the	  area	  destined	  to	  become	  the	  Historic	  Districts	  of	  Crown	  Heights	  North.	  The	  article	  calls	  out	  865	  Sterling	  as	  one	  location	  where	  a	  police	  officer	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involved	  in	  the	  raid	  broke	  her	  arm	  as	  she	  plunged	  through	  a	  makeshift	  trap	  door	  set	  up	  by	  the	  dealers.6	  In	  March	  2009,	  as	  previously	  referenced,	  a	  serious	  fire	  further	  traumatized	  the	  building.	  	  
	  	  The	  entire	  block	  has	  fallen	  victim	  to	  what	  the	  FBI’s	  2010	  Annual	  Mortgage	  Fraud	  report	  overarchingly	  describes	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  on	  neighborhoods:	  As	  the	  properties	  affected	  by	  mortgage	  fraud	  are	  sold	  at	  artificially	  inflated	  prices,	  properties	  in	  surrounding	  neighborhoods	  also	  become	  artificially	  inflated.	  When	  this	  occurs,	  property	  taxes	  also	  artificially	  increase.	  As	  unqualified	  homeowners	  begin	  to	  default	  on	  their	  inflated	  mortgages,	  properties	  go	  into	  foreclosure	  and	  neighborhoods	  begin	  to	  deteriorate	  and	  surrounding	  properties	  and	  neighborhoods	  witness	  their	  home	  values	  depreciating.	  As	  this	  happens,	  legitimate	  homeowners	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  sell	  their	  homes.7	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The	  devastation	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  is	  manifest	  and	  exasperating.	  A	  potential	  solution	  for	  the	  collateral	  damage	  of	  mortgage	  fraud	  through	  25-­‐311	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Law	  may	  seem	  unlikely,	  but	  is	  very	  possible.	  As	  stated	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  mortgage	  fraud	  will	  continue	  to	  creep	  into	  designated	  districts,	  and	  will	  increasingly	  show	  up	  as	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  The	  trajectory	  is	  unmistakable	  barring	  a	  short	  sale	  rescue	  or	  a	  miraculous	  solution	  heretofore	  unknown.	  In	  the	  interim,	  the	  Commission	  does	  intend	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  with	  regard	  to	  865	  Sterling	  Place,	  the	  second	  of	  its	  actions	  against	  a	  building	  destroyed	  by	  fraud.	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CONCLUSION	  	  As	  has	  been	  illustrated	  through	  the	  preceding	  case	  studies,	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  a	  multifarious	  problem	  that	  affects	  not	  only	  preservation;	  it	  is	  also	  the	  physical	  manifestation	  of	  myriad	  serious	  issues	  facing	  society.	  	  From	  the	  ostensibly	  innocuous	  confusion	  regarding	  ownership	  illustrated	  in	  467	  West	  140th	  Street	  to	  the	  brazen	  impertinence	  of	  the	  Goldman	  family	  regarding	  the	  Skidmore	  House,	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  the	  denouement	  of	  multiple	  issues,	  often	  occurring	  concurrently.	  If	  all	  of	  the	  NYC	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission’s	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  cases	  were	  analyzed	  for	  the	  predominant	  combination	  of	  causes,	  it	  would	  be	  revealed	  as	  advanced	  age,	  lack	  of	  resources,	  inheritance,	  and	  varying	  degrees	  of	  psychological	  instability.	  Some	  configuration	  of	  these	  four	  causes,	  either	  individually	  or	  as	  various	  combinations,	  account	  for	  approximately	  50%	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  identified	  by	  the	  Commission.	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  developer	  attempting	  to	  thwart	  the	  inviolability	  of	  a	  designated	  building	  is	  accountable	  for	  roughly	  5%	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  cases	  only.1	  	  	  As	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  thesis,	  misunderstanding	  or	  overstating	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  developer	  hinders	  our	  ability	  to	  confront	  the	  problem	  effectively.	  Over-­‐attribution	  to	  the	  developer	  not	  only	  misrepresents	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  designation,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  the	  erroneous	  conclusion	  that	  designation	  causes	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  it	  inhibits	  the	  development	  of	  equally	  developed	  and	  effective	  alternative	  strategies	  to	  litigation.	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Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  encourages	  municipal	  agency	  cooperation,	  community	  reporting,	  monitoring	  of	  designated	  properties,	  more	  aggressive	  enforcement,	  and	  increased	  funding	  for	  preservation	  commissions	  as	  solutions	  to	  combat	  demolition	  by	  neglect.2	  All	  of	  these	  are	  well	  intended	  and	  accurate,	  but	  there	  are	  complexities	  that	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  Behind	  municipal	  agencies	  are	  people—shifts	  in	  experience	  and	  demeanor	  can	  have	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  negotiating	  the	  characteristically	  unsettled	  terrain	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  impact	  the	  outcome.	  The	  Commission	  spends	  as	  much	  time	  today	  fighting	  the	  Department	  of	  Buildings	  as	  they	  do	  the	  building	  owners.	  For	  example,	  had	  the	  DOB	  been	  as	  aggressive	  ten	  years	  ago	  as	  they	  are	  today,	  the	  Skidmore	  House	  could	  have	  had	  a	  very	  different	  outcome.	  	  Community	  reporting	  varies	  widely	  from	  one	  area	  to	  another	  and	  is	  not	  a	  substitute	  for	  preservation	  commissions	  monitoring	  the	  buildings	  they	  designate—that	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  designation.	  Without	  enforcement,	  designation	  is	  quite	  literally	  meaningless	  and	  reduced	  to	  an	  honorific.	  Funding	  needs	  to	  be	  increased	  within	  preservation	  commissions	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  seriousness	  of	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  and	  its	  directly	  antithetical	  relationship	  to	  preservation.	  Preservation	  was	  founded	  in	  large	  part	  to	  combat	  demolition,	  not	  to	  ameliorate	  peeling	  paint	  and	  bad	  taste.	  The	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  thesis	  graphically	  illustrate	  that	  designation	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  building	  is	  safe.	  Enforcement	  and	  monitoring	  are	  critical	  components	  to	  agency	  maturation	  and	  must	  be	  given	  the	  same	  credence	  as	  the	  designation	  process	  within	  the	  agency	  and	  throughout	  the	  preservation	  community.	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  Finally,	  in	  New	  York,	  an	  intermediary	  entity	  needs	  to	  be	  created	  to	  mitigate	  the	  netherworld	  between	  the	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  owner	  who	  is	  unwilling	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard	  of	  good	  repair	  and	  the	  owner	  who	  is	  incapable	  of	  compliance	  for	  reasons	  of	  poverty,	  age,	  or	  mental	  instability.	  It	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  this	  thesis	  recommend	  how	  to	  prevent	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  As	  illustrated	  by	  the	  case	  studies,	  prophylaxis	  against	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  unpredictable	  nature	  of	  the	  causes.	  Realistically,	  only	  mortgage	  fraud	  has	  a	  predictive	  component.	  One	  thesis	  reviewed	  suggested	  analyzing	  known	  aggressive	  developers	  and	  isolating	  parcels	  they	  own	  that	  may	  be	  ripening	  for	  development.3	  This	  approach	  is	  not	  only	  unrealistic;	  it	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  overestimation	  of	  the	  developer	  as	  the	  primary	  problem.	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  stiffer	  penalties	  and	  clearer	  standards	  of	  good	  repair.4	  Those	  approaches	  assume	  the	  owner	  is	  capable,	  has	  resources	  available,	  and	  possibly	  does	  not	  understand	  what	  their	  local	  preservation	  commission	  expects	  in	  terms	  of	  property	  maintenance.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  clarify	  that	  many	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  owners	  will	  be	  entirely	  unresponsive	  to	  increased	  fines,	  laws,	  and	  guidelines.	  	  Demolition	  by	  neglect	  requires	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  solutions	  that	  target	  the	  source	  of	  the	  problem,	  not	  more	  of	  the	  same	  tools	  that	  are	  limited.	  	  	  To	  prediction	  and	  prevention,	  aberrant	  property	  owners	  with	  buildings	  that	  manifest	  as	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  often	  circumvent	  the	  typical	  channels	  to	  property	  ownership.	  City	  auctions	  appeal	  to	  the	  ambitions	  of	  people	  who	  often	  do	  not	  have	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the	  assets	  to	  actually	  realize	  their	  goals.	  Inheritance	  circumvents	  all	  safety	  nets	  to	  insure	  responsible	  property	  ownership.	  Mortgage	  fraud	  perpetrators	  isolate	  vulnerable	  people	  and	  buildings	  to	  defraud	  the	  owner	  and	  reduce	  the	  building	  to	  a	  target.	  Fragmented	  organizational	  ownership	  dilutes	  any	  sense	  of	  individual	  responsibility.	  Finally,	  senility,	  insanity,	  and	  impoverishment	  are	  moving	  targets	  that	  will	  never	  be	  predictable	  or	  preventable.	  Since	  it	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  prevent,	  understanding	  the	  causes	  and	  having	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  tools	  in	  place	  to	  respond	  swiftly	  and	  thoroughly	  best	  serve	  our	  response	  to	  demolition	  by	  neglect.	  	  Understanding	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  preservation	  and	  not	  a	  reaction	  against	  preservation	  is	  an	  important	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  Landmarks	  Law	  being	  called	  on	  to	  utilize	  good	  repair	  as	  a	  weapon	  against	  significant	  social	  crises	  is	  a	  watershed	  moment	  declaring	  the	  maturation	  of	  the	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission	  and	  of	  preservation	  as	  a	  whole.	  It	  demonstrates	  that	  preservation	  has	  grown	  far	  beyond	  perceptions	  of	  the	  field	  as	  an	  extraneous	  hold	  over	  from	  the	  long	  past	  crisis	  of	  urban	  renewal.	  Surrounding	  demolition	  by	  neglect	  with	  the	  skills,	  knowledge,	  and	  resources	  we	  have	  as	  preservationists	  allows	  for	  tremendous	  opportunity	  to	  directly	  affect	  a	  fundamental	  antithesis	  of	  preservation—demolition.	  It	  also	  reveals	  that	  preservation	  serves	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  and	  more	  useful	  way	  than	  it	  is	  often	  recognized.	  This	  thesis	  illustrates	  the	  great	  potential	  of	  preservation	  to	  rally	  around	  this	  important	  issue	  and	  make	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  world	  than	  we	  may	  have	  ever	  imagined.	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  December	  07,	  1997.	  Accessed	  November	  2012.	  http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/07/realestate/habitats-­‐96-­‐brooklyn-­‐avenue-­‐crown-­‐heights-­‐a-­‐landmark-­‐facade-­‐a-­‐troubled-­‐interior.html?pagewanted=2.	  	  Wilemon,	  Tom.	  "Decaying	  Heritage:	  Historic	  Preservation	  Reaches	  'tipping	  Point'"	  Memphis	  Daily	  News.	  Accessed	  December	  2012.	  http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/ArticleEmail.aspx?id=42899.	  	  "WMC	  Mortgage	  Sued	  by	  Trust	  Administrator	  in	  N.Y.	  Court."	  Bloomberg.	  Accessed	  January	  2013.	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-­‐12-­‐21/wmc-­‐mortgage-­‐sued-­‐by-­‐trust-­‐administrator-­‐in-­‐n-­‐y-­‐court.html.	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MEETINGS	  	  Bankoff,	  Simeon.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  12,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Executive	  Director	  Historic	  Districts	  Council	  	  	  	  Clark,	  Carol.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  December	  21,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Deputy	  Commissioner	  for	  Real	  Property	  and	  Legislative	  Affairs,	  New	  York	  	   State	  Office	  of	  Parks,	  Recreation	  and	  Historic	  Preservation	  	  	  	  Davis,	  Robert.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  March	  12,	  2013.	  	  	  	   Partner,	  Bryan	  Cave	  LLP	  	  	  	  Devonshire,	  Michael.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  February	  10,	  2013.	  	  	  	   Director	  of	  Conservation,	  Jan	  Hird	  Pokorny	  Associates	  	  	  	  Dietrich,	  Gregory.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  13,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Principal,	  Gregory	  Dietrich	  Preservation	  Consulting	  	  	  	  Farrell,	  Richard.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  December	  13,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Assistant	  District	  Attorney,	  King’s	  County,	  Brooklyn.	  Rackets	  and	  Real	  Estate	  	   Fraud	  	  	  	  Fine,	  Jonathan.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  2,	  2012.	  	  	  	   President,	  Preservation	  Chicago	  	  	  	  Gardner,	  Margaret	  Halsley.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  March	  15,	  2013.	  	  	  	   Director,	  Old	  Merchant's	  House	  Museum	  	  	  	  Goeken,	  Brian.	  Telephone	  call	  with	  author.	  October	  17,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Head	  of	  National	  Park	  Service’s	  Technical	  Preservation	  Services,	  Washington	  	   DC.	  Former	  Deputy	  Commissioner,	  Housing	  and	  Economic	  Development	  	   Department,	  Historic	  Preservation	  Division,	  City	  of	  Chicago	  	  	  	  Gorski,	  Eleanor.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  5,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Deputy	  Commissioner,	  Housing	  and	  Economic	  Development	  Department,	  	   Historic	  Preservation	  Division,	  City	  of	  Chicago	  	  	  	  Herrera,	  Alex.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  26,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Director,	  Technical	  Services	  Center,	  New	  York	  Landmarks	  Conservancy	  	  	  	  Jontef,	  Leora.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  April	  5,	  2013.	  	  	  	   Director,	  Third	  Party	  Transfer,	  NYC	  Housing	  Preservation	  and	  Development	  	  	  	  Kim,	  Po.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  March	  16,	  2013.	  	  	  	   Artist,	  former	  owner	  of	  the	  Skidmore	  House	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Lynch,	  Timothy.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  December	  3,	  2012.	  	  	  	   PE	  Executive	  Director,	  Forensic	  Engineering	  Unit,	  New	  York	  City	  Department	  	   of	  Buildings	  	  	  	  Mustaciuolo,	  Vito.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  December	  14,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Deputy	  Commissioner,	  NYC	  Housing	  Preservation	  and	  Development	  	  	  	  Peters,	  Jim.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  5,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Adjunct	  Professor,	  School	  of	  the	  Art	  Institute	  of	  Chicago,	  Adjunct	  Professor	  	   University	  of	  Illinois	  at	  Chicago,	  President	  Landmarks	  Illinois,	  Deputy	  	   Commissioner	  City	  of	  Chicago	  Department	  of	  Planning	  and	  Development	  	  	  	  Riccio,	  Dan.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  October	  5,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Director	  of	  Livability,	  City	  of	  Charleston	  Planning,	  Preservation,	  and	  	   Sustainability	  	  	  	  Silberman,	  Mark.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  December	  7,	  2012.	  	  	  	   General	  Counsel,	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  New	  York	  City	  	  	  	  Tatum,	  Terry.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  5,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Director	  of	  Research	  Housing	  and	  Economic	  Development	  Department,	  	   Historic	  Preservation	  Division,	  City	  of	  Chicago	  	  	  	  Tyus,	  Ethel.	  Multiple	  meetings	  with	  author.	  November	  2012-­‐May	  2013.	  	  	   President	  and	  Counsel,	  Crown	  Heights	  North	  Association	  	  	  Weiss,	  John	  M.	  Multiple	  meetings	  with	  author.	  June	  2012-­‐May	  2013.	  	  	   Deputy	  Counsel,	  Landmarks	  Preservation	  Commission,	  New	  York	  City	  	  	  Wood,	  Anthony.	  Meeting	  with	  author.	  November	  14,	  2012.	  	  	  	   Founder	  and	  Chair,	  New	  York	  Preservation	  Archive	  Project	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Appendix A 
 
Administrative Code of the City of New York Section 25-311: Maintenance and repair 
of improvements 
a. Every person in charge of an improvement on a landmark site or in an historic district   
shall keep in good repair  (1) all of the exterior portions of such improvement and (2) all 
interior portions thereof which, if not so maintained, may cause or tend to cause the exterior 
portions of such improvement to deteriorate, decay or become damaged or otherwise to fall 
into a state of disrepair. b. Every person in charge of an improvement containing an interior 
landmark shall keep in good repair (1) all portions of such interior landmark and (2) all 
other portions of the improvement which, if not so maintained, may cause or tend to cause 
the interior landmark contained in such improvement to deteriorate, decay or become 
damaged or otherwise fall into a state of disrepair. c. Every person in charge of a scenic 
landmark shall keep in good repair all portions thereof.  d. The provisions of this section 
shall be in addition to all other provisions of law requiring any such improvement to be kept 
in good repair. 
 
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 25-312: Remedying of dangerous 
conditions 
a. In any case where the department of buildings, the fire department or the department of 
health and mental hygiene, or any officer or agency thereof, or any court on application or at 
the instance of any such department, officer or agency, shall order or direct the construction, 
reconstruction, alteration or demolition of any improvement on a landmark site or in an 
historic district or containing an interior landmark, or the performance of any minor work 
upon such improvement, for the purpose of remedying  conditions determined to be 
dangerous to life, health or property, nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as  
making  it unlawful  for  any person, without prior issuance of a certificate of no effect on  
protected architectural features or certificates of  appropriateness or permit for minor work 
pursuant to this chapter, to comply with such order or direction. b. The department of 
buildings, fire department or department of health and mental hygiene, as the case may be, 
shall give the commission as early notice as is practicable, of the proposed issuance or 
issuance of any such order or direction. 
 
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 25-317: Criminal punishments and 
fines 
a. Any person who violates any provision of subdivision a of section 25-305 of this chapter 
or any order issued by the chair with respect to such provisions shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars and not 
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less than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. b. Any person who violates any provision of subdivision a of 
section 25-310 of this chapter or any provision of section 25-311 or any order issued by the 
chair with respect to such provisions shall be punished, for a first offense, by a fine of not 
more than one thousand dollars and not less than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment 
for not more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and shall be punished 
for a second or subsequent offense, by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or less 
than two thousand five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment. c. Any person who willfully makes any false 
statement or an omission of material fact in an application or request to the commission for 
a certificate, permit or other approval or in any document submitted to the commission 
certifying the correction of a violation, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five 
thousand dollars or less than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than 
ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. d. For the purposes of this subdivision, 
each day during which there exists any violation of the provisions of paragraph three of 
subdivision a of section 25-305 of this chapter or paragraph two of subdivision a of section 
25-310 of this chapter or any violation of the provisions of section 25-311 of this chapter or 
any order issued by the chair with respect to such provisions shall constitute a separate 
violation.  
 
Administrative Code of the City of New York § 25-317.1: Civil penalties 
 
a. Any person who violates any provision of sections 25-305, 25-310 or 25-311 or 
subdivision c of section 25-317 of this chapter or any order issued by the chair with respect 
to such provisions shall be liable for a civil penalty which may be recovered by the 
corporation counsel in a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. Such civil 
penalty shall be determined as follows: (1) The defendant shall be liable for a civil penalty of 
up to the fair market value of the improvement parcel, with or without the improvement, 
whichever is greater, where in violation of such provision or order: (a) all or substantially all 
of an improvement on a landmark site or within a historic district has been demolished;     
(b) work has been performed or a condition created or maintained which significantly 
impairs the structural integrity of an improvement on a landmark site or within a historic 
district; (c) work has been performed or a condition created or maintained which results in 
the destruction, removal or significant alteration of more than fifty percent of the square 
footage of two facades of an improvement on a landmark site or within a historic district,  
including party and sidewalls; or (d) the defendant has failed to take action to prevent any 
condition described in subparagraph a, b or c of this paragraph from occurring. (2) Where, 
in violation of such provision or order, work is performed or a condition is created or 
maintained which results in the destruction, removal or significant alteration of a significant 
portion of the protected features identified in the designation report of an interior landmark, 
the defendant shall be liable for a civil penalty equal to two times the estimated cost of 
replicating the protected features that were demolished, removed or altered. (3) All other 
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violations. The defendant shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than five thousand 
dollars. 
(4) For the purposes of this subdivision, each day during which there exists any violation of 
the provisions of paragraph three of subdivision a of section 25-305 of this chapter or 
paragraph two of subdivision a of section 25-310 of this chapter or subdivision a, b or c of 
section 25-311 of this chapter or any order issued by the chair with respect to such 
provisions shall constitute a separate violation. b. In addition to or as an alternative to any of 
the remedies and penalties provided in this chapter, any person who violates any provision of 
sections 25-305, 25-310 or 25-311 or subdivision c of section 25-317 of this chapter or any 
order issued by the chair with respect to such provisions shall be liable for a civil penalty 
which may be recovered in an administrative proceeding before the office of administrative 
trials and hearings, the environmental control board or other administrative tribunal having  
jurisdiction as hereinafter provided. (1) An administrative proceeding for civil penalties shall 
be commenced by the service of a notice of violation in accordance with the applicable law 
and rules governing the procedures of the administrative tribunal before which the notice of 
violation is returnable or as otherwise provided by the rules of the commission. The notice of 
violation shall identify the allegedly illegal conditions or work with reasonable specificity. As 
used in this subdivision, the term "reasonable specificity" shall mean a description of work or 
conditions, reasonably described given the circumstances, sufficient to inform a reasonable 
person that (1) work has been or is being done without an appropriate approval from the 
commission, (2) conditions have been created or are being maintained in violation of this 
chapter, or (3) there has been a failure to take action to prevent conditions that are in 
violation of this chapter. Such administrative tribunal shall have the power to impose civil 
penalties in accordance with this chapter. A judgment of an administrative tribunal imposing 
civil penalties may be enforced by the commencement of a civil action or proceeding in a 
court or as otherwise authorized by the applicable law governing the procedures of such 
administrative tribunal. Prior to serving a notice of violation, the chair shall serve a warning 
letter upon a respondent either personally or by mail in the manner provided by the rules of 
the commission. The warning letter shall inform the respondent that the chair believes the 
respondent has violated the provisions of this chapter, shall describe generally the allegedly 
illegal conditions and/or activities, shall warn the respondent that the law authorizes   civil 
penalties for such violations, and shall provide the respondent with a grace period for 
removing or applying for a permit to legalize or otherwise address the allegedly illegal 
conditions. No such warning letter shall be required prior to the service of a notice of 
violation where (i) the subject violation is a second or subsequent offense, (ii) the subject 
violation is alleged to be an intentional violation, or (iii) the chair is seeking civil penalties for 
failure to comply with a stop work order, issued pursuant to this chapter. (2) Except as 
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, where a respondent has been found liable for 
or admitted liability to a violation of this chapter in an administrative proceeding, a civil 
penalty for such violation shall be imposed in accordance with the schedule set forth below. 
(a) Type A and Type B violations. (i) First offense. The respondent shall be liable for a civil 
penalty of not more than five thousand dollars. (ii) Second and subsequent offenses. The 
respondent shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than two hundred fifty dollars a day 
for each day that a condition underlying a prior violation continues to exist, measured from 
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the date the respondent was found liable for or admitted liability to the prior violation, but 
in no event shall the civil penalty be less than the maximum possible penalty for a first 
offense. (b) Type C violation. (i) First offense. The respondent shall be liable for a civil 
penalty of not more than five hundred dollars. (ii) Second and subsequent offenses. The 
respondent shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than fifty dollars a day for each day 
that a condition underlying a prior violation continues to exist, measured from the date the 
respondent was found liable for or pled guilty to the prior violation, but in no event shall the 
civil penalty be less than the maximum possible penalty for a first offense. (3) 
Notwithstanding the penalty schedule set forth above, the chair may, in his or her discretion, 
for good cause shown, recommend that a lesser or no civil penalty be imposed on a 
respondent in an administrative proceeding. (4) Restrictions on service of notice of violation 
for second or subsequent offense. (a) The chair shall not serve a notice of violation for a 
second or subsequent offense unless (i) more than twenty-five days have elapsed since the 
respondent was found liable or admitted liability In the prior proceeding and  (ii) where the 
respondent in the prior proceeding has submitted an application to the commission for an 
appropriate approval to legalize or to undertake the work necessary to cure the condition 
underlying the prior proceeding, more than thirty days have elapsed since such application 
has been disapproved or denied in whole or in part or if granted, such approval by its terms 
has expired. If the respondent has filed more than one such application with the commission, 
the thirty day period shall commence after the first such application has been disapproved or 
denied in whole or in part or, if granted, by its terms has expired. (b) Nothing in this 
subdivision shall prohibit the chair, subject to the rules of the administrative tribunal having 
jurisdiction over the proceeding, from serving an amended notice of violation for the 
purpose of clarifying the allegedly illegal conditions referred to in the prior notice of 
violation, or from serving a subsequent notice of violation that alleges separate violations of 
this chapter. An amended notice of violation shall be returnable on the same date and before 
the same administrative body as the initial notice of violation. (5) Multiple violations 
incurred for the same work.  If work, reasonably identified in a notice of violation, was done 
without an appropriate approval from the commission, the total amount of any civil penalty 
for such work shall be determined by, to the extent feasible, separately considering and 
assessing a penalty for each type of work and/or each distinct effect on the protected features 
of the landmark, interior landmark or improvement in an historic district. In no event shall 
the civil penalty exceed five thousand dollars for a first offense. Where the respondent is the 
owner, separate penalties shall not be assessed for each type of work and/or each distinct 
effect if the illegal work was performed during a period of time when the premises were 
leased to and under the control of a person other than the owner. (6) Grace period. (a) No 
civil penalty shall be imposed in an administrative proceeding for a first violation if prior to 
the return date of the notice of violation; the respondent concedes liability for the violation 
and supplies the commission with proof, satisfactory to the commission, that the violation 
has been corrected. If the respondent makes any misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact to the commission regarding the removal of the violation, the respondent shall be liable 
for a civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars. (b) No civil penalty shall be 
imposed in an administrative proceeding for a first violation if prior to the return date of the 
notice of violation the respondent concedes liability for the violation and submits an 
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application to the commission for approval to legalize or to undertake the work necessary to 
cure the violation. (c) The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to a second or 
subsequent offense or where the respondent is alleged to have violated a stop work order or 
where the respondent has after the issuance of a warning letter pursuant to paragraph one of 
subdivision (b) of section 25-317.1 applied for and received a permit to cure or otherwise 
address a violation, and the respondent has failed to cure the violation pursuant to the terms 
of such permit. 
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Appendix B 
 
A GUIDE TO SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 
PURSUANT TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW §§ 510 - 511 
AND RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW § 12 	  
Introduction 	  
This booklet has been prepared by New York State Attorney General Eric T. 
Schneiderman’s Charities Bureau to assist not-for-profit corporations and religious corporations 
seeking court approval for sales and other dispositions of assets pursuant to Not-for-Profit 
Corporation Law (“N-PCL”) §§ 510-511 and Religious Corporations Law (“RCL”) § 12. 	  
The procedures discussed in this booklet are not intended to serve as a substitute for legal 
advice from an attorney, but are designed as a guide to help organizations and their attorneys 
understand the statutory requirements and the procedures used by the Attorney General to review 
such transactions. 	  
The information contained in this booklet is general in nature. Each transaction is 
governed by its own facts and is reviewed by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis. You 
are encouraged to discuss the proposed transaction in advance with the Attorney General’s 
Charities Bureau. 	  
What Transactions Are Covered 	  
Not-for-Profit Corporations: 	  
The sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of a 
Type B1 or Type C not-for-profit corporation requires court approval in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in N-PCL §§ 510-511. (N-PCL § 510(a)(3)). Type D not-for-profit 
corporations are treated as Type B corporations for purposes of this statute. (N-PCL § 201(c)). 	  
The assets may be real and/or personal property, including intangible property such as 
bonds, stocks or certificates of deposit. 	  
There is no fixed numerical or arithmetic measure of “all or substantially all.” Court 
approval is required where the asset to be sold represents a large proportion of the corporation’s 	  	  
1 New York not-for-profit corporations are designated as Type A, B, C or D, depending  
on the corporation’s purposes. Type A includes corporations formed for civic, patriotic, political, 
social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural and similar purposes; it also includes professional, 
commercial, industrial or trade associations. Type B includes corporations formed for charitable, 
educational, religious, scientific, literary or cultural purposes and societies for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals. Type C includes corporations formed for any lawful business 
purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective. Type D corporations may be  
formed pursuant to “any other law of this state for any business or non-business, or pecuniary or 
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non-pecuniary, purpose or purposes specified by such other law, whether such purpose or 
purposes are also within types A, B, C above or otherwise.” N-PCL § 201(b). 
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total assets or where the sale of the asset may affect the ability of the corporation to carry out its 
purposes regardless of the percentage of the corporation’s total assets represented by the sale. 	  
Exceptions to Covered Transactions: 
Type A not-for-profit corporations 
Mortgages  (unless a component of the transaction would otherwise come within 
N-PCL §§ 510-511) 	  
Religious Corporations: 	  
The sale, mortgage or lease for a term exceeding five years of any real property of a 
religious corporation requires court approval pursuant to N-PCL § 511.  (RCL § 12(1)). 	  
Court approval is required even if the religious corporation’s real property does not 
constitute all or substantially all of its assets. 	  
Exceptions to Covered Transactions: 	  
Purchase money mortgages or purchase money security agreements (RCL § 
12(1)) 	  
Real property acquired as a result of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding or by a 
deed in lieu of the foreclosure of a mortgage owned by a religious corporation 
(RCL § 12(10)) 	  
The following religious corporations require court approval but do not need to 
give notice to the Attorney General: Protestant Episcopal Church, Roman 
Catholic Church, Ruthenian Catholic Church of the Greek Rite, African 
Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Presbyterian Church of the General Assembly 
of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., United Methodist Church, Reformed Church 
of the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America.  (RCL §§ 2-b(1)(d-1) 
and 12(2)-(5-c)). 	  
Role of the Attorney General 	  
The N-PCL requires that, upon filing the petition with the court, the Attorney General be 
given a minimum of 15 days notice before a hearing on the application.  N-PCL § 511(b).  The 
procedure preferred by the Charities Bureau and most courts, however, is to submit the petition 
and proposed order to the Attorney General for review in advance of filing with the court.  This 
enables the Attorney General to review the papers to ensure that all statutory requirements are 
met, that all necessary documents are included as exhibits, and that any concerns of the Attorney 
General are resolved before submission to the court. 
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If, after such a review, the Attorney General has no objection to the relief requested, we 
will provide written confirmation, usually by means of an endorsement on the proposed order, 
and will waive statutory notice.  The petition can then usually be submitted to the court ex parte 
without the need for the 15 day waiting period, and without the need for a return date or hearing, 
depending on the practice of the local court. 	  
Statutory Standard 	  
Under the two-prong test of N-PCL § 511, the court must find 1) that the consideration 
and the terms of the transaction are fair and reasonable to the corporation and 2) that the purposes 
of the corporation or the interests of its members will be promoted.  (N-PCL § 511(d)) by the 
transaction. 	  	  	  
below. 
These statutory standards and other statutory requirements are discussed more fully 	  
Board Approval 	  
The transaction must be approved by the corporation’s board.  A vote of at least 2/3 of the 
corporation’s entire board is required unless the board has 21 or more directors, in which case a 
vote of a majority of the entire board is sufficient.  (N-PCL §§ 509 and 510(a)(2)).  A 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws may provide for greater quorum or voting 
requirements. The resolution must specify the terms and conditions of the proposed transaction, 
including the consideration to be received by the corporation and the eventual disposition to be 
made of such consideration, and a statement of whether or not dissolution of the corporation is 
contemplated. 	  
If the transaction involves a sale or transfer to one or more of the corporation’s directors 
or officers, or to another corporation in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors 
or officers or have directly or indirectly a substantial financial interest, the requirements of 
N-PCL § 715 must be met.  The material facts must be disclosed to the board, and the transaction 
must be authorized by a vote of a disinterested majority of the board.  The Attorney General will 
require similar disclosures for transactions involving family members of directors, officers, 
employees or other insiders. 	  
Membership Approval 	  
If a corporation has voting members, the transaction must also be approved by the 
corporation’s membership.  The procedure for the membership vote is set forth in N-PCL 
§ 510(a)(1). 	  
First, the board must adopt a resolution recommending the transaction.  The resolution 
must specify the terms and conditions of the proposed transaction, including the consideration to 
be received by the corporation and the eventual disposition to be made of such consideration, and 
a statement of whether or not dissolution of the corporation is contemplated. 
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The board resolution must then be submitted to a vote at an annual or special meeting of 
members entitled to vote on it. Notice of the meeting must be given to each member and each 
holder of subvention certificates or bonds of the corporation, whether or not entitled to vote.  The 
members may approve the proposed transaction according to the terms of the board resolution, or 
authorize the board to modify the terms and conditions of the proposed transaction, by a 2/3 vote. 
The number of affirmative votes must be at least equal to the quorum.  (N-PCL § 613(c)). 	  
The quorum for a membership meeting is a majority (N-PCL § 608(a)) unless the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation or by-laws provides for a greater or lesser quorum 
requirement. (N-PCL §§ 608(b) and 615). If the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide 
for a lesser quorum, the quorum may be not less than the number entitled to cast one hundred 
votes or one-tenth of the total number of votes entitled to be cast, whichever is lesser. (N-PCL 
§ 608(b)).  For religious corporations, where the RCL provides a different quorum, the RCL 
governs.  In the case of some religious corporations, the quorum is at least six persons. (See, 
e.g., RCL §§ 134, 164 and 195).  The quorum requirement for other religious denominations may 
be different; consult the applicable article of the RCL. 	  
Voting by proxy is permitted for members of not-for-profit corporations under N-PCL 
§ 609 and for members of Jewish religious corporations under RCL § 207. 	  
If the transaction involves a sale or transfer directly or indirectly to one or more of the 
corporation’s directors or officers or to another corporation in which one or more of its directors 
or officers are directors or officers, or directly or indirectly have a substantial financial interest, 
the requirements of N-PCL § 715(a)(2) must be met. The material facts must be disclosed to the 
members and the transaction must be authorized by a membership vote. The Attorney General 
will require similar disclosures for transactions involving family members of directors, officers, 
employees or other insiders. 	  
Fair and Reasonable Consideration: Appraisals 	  
In order to determine whether or not the consideration is fair and reasonable, there must 
be an appraisal of the asset to be sold.  Although the statute does not explicitly require an 
appraisal, case law establishes that fair market value can be determined by means of an appraisal, 
and the court, and the Attorney General, will reject the petition if it is not supported by an 
appraisal. 	  
The appraisal should be full and rendered by an appraiser who is completely independent 
of both buyer and seller.  The appraisal cannot be provided by a broker involved in the sale of the 
property.  The Attorney General may require that the appraisal be performed by a board certified 
appraiser, especially if the property to be sold is commercial real property or a business.  If the 
asset is real property, the appraisal should be based on at least three comparable sales, unless a 
different valuation method is more appropriate. 	  
If the transaction is not an arm’s length transaction (i.e., if it involves a sale or transfer to 
a director, officer, employee or other person with some connection to the petitioner corporation), 
the Attorney General may require two appraisals. 
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An appraisal is not necessary where a solvent religious corporation seeks to convey real 
property to another religious corporation or to a membership, educational, municipal or 
not-for-profit corporation for nominal consideration. (RCL § 12(8)). 	  
An appraisal is not necessary for religious corporation mortgages from institutional 
lenders. 	  
Use of Proceeds 	  
The use of the proceeds must be consistent with the corporation’s purposes. Sale 
proceeds cannot be used for the benefit of a director, officer, employee, member or other 
interested party. 	  
Where the property to be sold is a religious corporation’s house of worship or a 
not-for-profit corporation’s main premises and as of the date of the sale the corporation has not 
yet entered into a contract to purchase or lease new premises, the Attorney General will require 
that the sale proceeds be placed in escrow to ensure that funds will be available to obtain new 
premises so that the corporation can continue to carry out its corporate purposes. 	  
Option Contracts 	  
Option contracts require court approval at the time the option is exercised. The Charities 
Bureau discourages the use of option or other contingent contracts by not-for-profit and religious 
corporations, especially if they may be exercised over a long term. 	  
Requirements for the Verified Petition 
The verified petition must set forth the following required statements and information: 
The name of the corporation.  (N-PLC  § 511(a)(1)).  The name should appear 
exactly as it does in the certificate of incorporation. 	  
The law under or by which it was incorporated (i.e., Not-for-Profit Corporation 
Law, Religious Corporations Law, an act of the legislature, etc.).  (N-PCL 
§ 511(a)(1)). A copy of the certificate of incorporation and all amendments 
thereto, and a certified copy of the corporation’s complete by-laws, should be 
attached as an exhibit. 	  
The names of its directors and principal officers, and their places of residence. (N-
PCL § 511(a)(2)). 	  
The activities of the corporation. (N-PCL § 511(a)(3)).  This should include a 
description of the purposes for which it was formed and its activities. 	  
A description of the assets to be sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of 
(or mortgaged if a religious corporation), or a statement that it is proposed to sell, 
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lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of (or mortgage if a religious corporation) all 
or substantially all of the corporate assets more fully described in a schedule 
attached to the petition.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(4)).  A copy of the contract, lease, 
proposed deed or mortgage commitment should be attached as an exhibit.  If the 
contract has been  assigned, or is to be assigned at or prior to closing, a copy of 
the assignment agreement should also be attached as an exhibit. 	  
A statement of the fair value of such assets.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(4)). A copy of the 
appraisal should be attached as an exhibit. 	  
A statement of the amount of the corporation’s debts and liabilities and how 
secured.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(4)).  In addition, a copy of the most recent annual 
financial report (i.e., IRS Form 990 or 990-PF) or audited financial statements 
should be attached as an exhibit.  If the corporation does not file a 990 or 990-PF 
and does not have annual financial reports, it should prepare a schedule certified 
by its Treasurer of all assets, liabilities, income and expenses of the corporation 
and attach it as an exhibit.  In certain circumstances, the Attorney General may 
decide that financial statements certified by an independent accountant are 
required. 	  
The consideration to be received by the corporation. (N-PCL § 511(a)(5)). If the 
consideration is less than the appraised value of the assets, include a documented 
explanation. 	  
The disposition to be made of the proceeds.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(5)). This should 
include a full description of the proposed use of the proceeds.  If the corporation is 
purchasing or leasing new premises, a copy of the contract or lease should be 
attached as an exhibit. 	  
A statement as to whether or not the dissolution of the corporation is 
contemplated.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(5)).  In certain circumstances, the Attorney 
General will require that the proceeds be placed in escrow if the corporation plans 
to dissolve.  In addition, if the corporation plans to dissolve after the sale, the legal 
doctrine of quasi cy pres requires that the net proceeds be distributed under the 
plan of dissolution to organizations engaged in substantially similar activities. 
(N-PCL § 1005(a)(3)(A). 	  
A statement that the consideration and the terms of the sale, lease exchange or 
other disposition (or mortgage if a religious corporation) of the assets of the 
corporation are fair and reasonable to the corporation, and a concise statement of 
the reasons therefor.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(6)). 	  
A statement that the purposes of the corporation or the interests of its members 
will be promoted by the transaction, and a concise statement of the reasons 
therefor.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(6)). 
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A statement that the transaction has been recommended or authorized by vote of 
the directors in accordance with law, at a meeting duly called and held, as shown 
in a schedule annexed to the petition setting forth a copy of the resolution granting 
such authority with a statement of the vote thereon. (N-PCL § 511(a)(7)). Include 
the total number of directors, the number of directors present at the meeting, the 
vote pro and con, and what constitutes a quorum.  The board resolution should be 
attached as an exhibit.  (See also Board Approval above for voting requirements). 	  
Where the consent of the members is required by law, a statement that such 
consent has been given, as shown in a schedule annexed to the petition setting 
forth a copy of such consent, if in writing, or of a resolution giving such consent, 
adopted at a meeting of members duly called and held, with a statement of the 
vote thereon.  (N-PCL § 511(a)(8)).  Include the total number of members, the 
number of members present at the meeting, the vote pro and con, and what 
constitutes a quorum.  The membership resolution should be attached as an 
exhibit.  (See also Membership Approval above for voting procedures and 
requirements and for required contents of the resolution). 	  
A prayer for leave to sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of all or 
substantially all the assets of the corporation as set forth in the petition, or in the 
case of a religious corporation to sell, mortgage or lease real property.  (N-PCL 
§ 511(a)(9)). 	  
The caption should include the name of the corporation as it appears in the 
certificate of incorporation. The caption should also set forth what the application 
is for and the applicable statute.  Do not list the Attorney General as a respondent. 	  
The petition must be verified. 	  
Venue 	  
The petition must be filed in the supreme court of the judicial district or county court of 
the county where the corporation has its office or principal place of carrying out the purposes for 
which it was formed, even if the asset to be sold is located elsewhere.  (N-PCL §§ 510(a)(3) and 
511(a)). 	  
Notice to Interested Persons 	  
The court in its discretion may direct that notice of the application be given to any 
interested person, such as a member, officer or creditor of the corporation.  (N-PCL § 511(b)). 
The notice shall specify the time and place, fixed by the court, for a hearing upon the application. 
Any person interested, whether or not formally notified, may appear at the hearing and show 
cause why the application should not be granted. 	  
In certain circumstances, the Attorney General may ask the court to give notice to 
interested parties (including tenants or other occupants of the premises) and/or hold an 
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evidentiary hearing.  For example, if there is a membership dispute, a dispute as to who 
constitutes a duly authorized board or a question about the adequacy of the consideration, the 
Attorney General may ask the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute. 	  
Notice to Creditors 	  
If the corporation is insolvent or if its assets are insufficient to liquidate its debts and 
liabilities in full, all creditors of the corporation must be served with a notice of the time and 
place of the hearing. (N-PCL § 511(c)). In such circumstances, notice to creditors is required by 
statute, and the petition cannot be approved by the court ex parte. 	  
Requirements for the Order 	  
A copy of the proposed order should be submitted to the Attorney General with the 
verified petition. 	  
The order should set forth the terms of the transaction and the consideration. (N-PCL 
§ 511(d)).  For sales, include the sale price, the purchaser and the address of the property.  For 
leases, include the amount of rent, the term of the lease, the lessee and the address of the 
property. For mortgages, include the amount of the loan, the interest rate, the length of the 
mortgage and the address of the property. 	  
The order must also set forth the use of the proceeds to be received by the corporation. 
(N-PCL § 511(d)).  If all or part of the proceeds are to be placed in escrow, this shall be set forth 
in the order.  Funds in escrow may only be released by further order of the court on notice to the 
Attorney General. 	  
In addition, the Attorney General requires that the order contain the following statements: 
that a copy of the signed court order shall be served on the Attorney General, and that the 
Attorney General shall receive written notice that the transaction has been completed (i.e., upon 
closing), if the transaction has been abandoned, or if it is still pending 90 days after court 
approval. 	  
Attorney General Registration 	  
If the corporation is required to register with the Attorney General pursuant to Executive 
Law Article 7-A or Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 8-1.4, the Attorney General will check to 
ensure that the corporation is registered and that its annual financial reports are up to date before 
completing the review of the transaction. 	  
If the corporation is not registered, or if its reports are delinquent, it will be required to 
register and file all required annual financial reports before the Attorney General’s review can be 
completed. 	  
If the purchaser is required to register, its registration and reports must also be current 
before the Attorney General’s review can be completed. 
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Certain corporations, such as religious corporations, are exempt from 
registration. 	  
Government Agency Approvals 	  
If other government agency approvals are required for the proposed transaction 
(i.e., NYS Department of Health, Public Health Council, Dormitory Authority, HUD, 
etc.), the Attorney General will require that such approvals be obtained before the 
Attorney General review is completed. A copy of each government agency approval 
should be attached as an exhibit. 	  
Conclusion 	  
If you have any questions about the information contained in this booklet or 
about the procedures for obtaining Attorney General review and court approval of a 
transaction you may contact the Attorney General’s Charities Bureau or any of the 
Attorney General’s regional offices for assistance.  A current list of regional office 
addresses and telephone numbers is included with this booklet. 	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2000 Better Government Competition WINNER 	  	  	  	  	  	  
Breaking the Cycle of Abandonment 	  
Using a Tax Enforcement Tool to Return Distressed 
Properties to Sound Private Ownership 	  	  
Christopher J. Allred 
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development1 
	  
Reclamation of an 
abandoned  apartment 
building in New York City. 	  	  
THE PROBLEM 	  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the City of New York (“the City”) suffered a surge of 
disinvestment and housing abandonment in many of its neighborhoods. A number of 
factors contributed to the disinvestment. According to Frank P. Braconi, the Executive 
Director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council, 	  
The fundamental cause of housing abandonment was demographic change and the steady 
impoverishment and depopulation of many inner-city neighborhoods. As middle- and 
working-class whites sought more attractive housing options...black and Puerto Rican mi- 
grants replaced them in the city’s older, more densely built neighborhoods…. These minorities 
tended to have lower incomes and far higher rates of joblessness, making it more difficult for 
owners of marginal rental buildings to collect rents commensurate with building maintenance 
and operating expenses.2 	  
The problem was exacerbated by the high fuel costs, high inflation rates, and 
difficult economic times of the 1970s. Higher heating bills increased owner operating 
expenses, while high inflation rates made refinancing impossible and increased owner 
debt service expenses. Owners could not recover these increased costs because their 
tenants could not afford higher rents. According to Mr. Braconi,“Between 1971 and 
1981 heating oil prices increased by 430 percent and overall operating costs of apart- 
ment buildings in New York City rose by 131 percent…. Those years coincided with 
the period of peak housing abandonment.”3 
Unable to make a profit on their properties during this time, many owners deferred 
maintenance and services, which led to further physical and financial decline of build- 
ings. As income decreased and costs increased, many owners were unable to pay the 
property taxes on their buildings, which ultimately led to City foreclosure. 
Once owners recognized City foreclosure was imminent, they often intentionally 
accelerated property disinvestment: they failed to make repairs and stopped services, and 
many eventually abandoned their buildings. Unwilling to let occupied buildings go 
unmanaged, the City 
took ownership of these 
properties through in 
rem foreclosures.4 
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1 Robin Weinstein, acting deputy commissioner of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development’s Office of Housing Intervention and Resources, provided substan- tial assistance with content 
and  editing. 
2 Frank P. Braconi, “In Re In Rem: Innovation and Expediency in New York’s Housing Policy,” in Michael 
H. Schill (ed.), Housing and Community Development in New York City: Facing the Future (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1999),  pp.  94-95. 
3 Braconi, p. 96. 
4 In rem is Latin for “against the thing” and refers to foreclosure actions on real estate for tax delinquency. 
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The City had initi- 
ated the policy of 
foreclosure with two 
goals in mind: to 
encourage tax com- 
pliance and to allow 
the City to intervene 
in these buildings 
before they deterio- 
rated completely…. 
However, despite its 
sustained efforts the 
City was not up to 
the Herculean task of 
managing thousands 
of buildings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Braconi, p. 99. 
6 “Turning Houses into Homes,” 
Daily News, 11 October 1999, 
p. 40. 
The City had initiated the policy of foreclosure with two goals in mind: to encourage 
tax compliance and to allow the City to intervene in these buildings before they 
deteriorated completely. At the time, the City hoped its intervention would rescue the 
buildings, and in some areas the City succeeded. 	  
Between the winter of 1979 and the winter of 1981 the percentage of occupied in rem 
buildings without heat on any given day was reduced from nine to two, and the median time 
required to restore heat was cut from 14 days to three. Overall, the number of tenant com- 
plaints received by the agency’s Central Complaint Bureau decreased from 56,000 in 1979 to 
13,400 in 1983.5 	  
However, despite its sustained efforts the City was not up to the Herculean task of 
managing thousands of buildings. As one local newspaper editorial put it,“Back in the 
1970s and ’80s, the City seized so many buildings for tax arrears it became the biggest 
slumlord in the state....Those buildings were dumps when the city seized them, and, 
sadly, most remain that way—barely habitable magnets for crime, disease and misfortune.”6 	  	  
The Sickest Block in New York City 	  
Once called the “Sickest Block in the City of New York,” by 1994, 22 of 36 buildings 
on West 140th Street had been abandoned to city control.7 	  
The building at 212 West 
140th Street had been taken 
into City ownership through 
an in rem tax foreclosure ac- 
tion on May 25, 1978. At the 
time of foreclosure, the owner 
owed $30,013.54 in delin- 
quent property taxes. The 
building was originally con- 
structed in 1926 to provide 
housing for 18 working fami- 
lies. By 1980 it was vacant. 
In April 1995 the City 
7 Brian Kates, “The Sick Truth 
About W. 140th: Disease, 
Neglect, Vermin And Death,” 
Daily News, 27 December 
1994, p. 13. 
	  
began rehabilitation of the 
building. The project was 
completed in June 1996 at a 
total cost of $1.33 million. 
The entrance to 212 West 140th Street in New York City 
prior to rehabilitation by the City (left)—17 years after 
the building was acquired by foreclosure—and a year 
later (right) after renovations were finally completed. 
8 City of New York Depart- 
ment of Finance tax records 
as of 15 September 2000. 
9 Michael van Biema, 
Assistant Commissioner, 
Division of Property Manage- 
ment, City of New York 
Department of Housing 
Preservation and Develop- 
ment, “FY1998 New Needs,” 
memo to Judy Wada, Budget 
Director, Office ofthe 
Commissioner, 30 December, 
1997, table 3 ($4,069 per 
unit total annual mainte- 
nance, repair, and fuel costs, 
not including rental income). 
During the 18 years of City ownership the City lost approximately $160,000 in tax rev- 
enue.8 Based on program per-unit maintenance and utility cost averages, the City spent 
approximately $1.3 million maintaining this building.9 In sum, between maintenance, 
foregone tax revenue, and rehabilitation costs, the City spent approximately $2.8 million 
to restore the building to the private sector working class housing it was years earlier. 	  	  
By 1994, the City owned and managed 5,458 buildings—most were dilapidated 
multi-family housing occupied by a low-income population. Tremendous efforts were 
made to address the severe physical and financial problems facing most of these proper- 
ties. However, the City lacked sufficient capital resources to address their needs. The 
resulting impact on neighborhood quality-of-life and on local real estate markets was 
devastating. It was clear the City could no longer be the landlord of last resort. A new, 
more effective strategy was needed. 
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The City asked the Arthur Anderson consulting firm to assess the costs associated 
with the in rem stock, consisting of 51,672 units in 5,458 buildings, of which 75 percent 
were occupied (see figure 1). The average length of City ownership of these in rem 
properties was 19 years.While the foreclosed properties had an average tax delinquency 
of $36,000 at vesting, the City spent an average of $2.2 million to acquire, manage, 
repair, and dispose of each vested building. The estimated total cost to the City was 
$10.6 billion, excluding an average of $209,000 per property in foregone tax revenues.10 	  
In addition, despite the City’s large capital investment in these buildings, many of 
them continued to have significant physical maintenance deficiencies. According to the 
1991 Housing and Vacancy Survey, 22.9 percent of the properties had four or more 
heating breakdowns, 66.4 percent had cracks or holes in walls/ceilings/floors, 35.5 
percent had broken plaster, and 76.9 percent had rodents present.11 A moratorium on  
in rem vesting was declared in 1993. 	  	  
A NEW STRATEGY: THE THIRD PARTY TRANSFER INITIATIVE 
	  
Figure 1. New York 
Housing  Preservation 
and Development 








Units Properties 	  
In 1994, led by former New York City Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development (HPD) Commissioner Deborah Wright, the administration gathered a 
group of tax and housing policy experts to determine a more effective strategy. The 
City also enlisted pro bono assistance from Arthur Anderson. 
The group recommended the City sell the liens on all tax delinquent properties. 
However, HPD recognized that focusing only on tax collection would be insufficient 
for distressed residential properties. The City had an approximately 3.4 percent housing 
vacancy rate, and it could not afford to lose any residential housing.12 Furthermore, tax 
lien sales alone would do nothing to improve the living conditions for the tenants of 
those buildings. 
HPD then redefined the parameters of this approach: distressed properties would 
not be part of tax lien sales, but would instead be transferred to new ownership, and 
rehabilitation would be carried out by the private sector with private financing lever- 
aged with public funds. Commissioner Wright turned to staff from across the agency to 
form a team that began formulating the program that would become the Third Party 
Transfer Initiative. This new approach fundamentally changed the City’s policy for 
addressing distressed housing. 
In 1996 and 1997 the City obtained legislation that transformed its property tax 
foreclosure authority in two fundamental respects. First, the new authority allows the 
City to use the in rem foreclosure process to transfer ownership of tax delinquent 
properties directly to new owners without taking title itself, avoiding the cost of man- 
aging the properties and preparing them for sale.13 Further, the new authority permits 
the City to initiate in rem actions in geographic areas as small as a tax block, roughly 
equivalent to a city block.14 HPD thus can use its foreclosure authority strategically to 
address critical buildings and blocks and to complement its ongoing in rem disposition 
and neighborhood reinvestment initiatives. The process focuses on troubled buildings 
with problems that go beyond tax arrears and provides quick and effective intervention 
to turn them around and to improve conditions for the tenants. 
	  
Occupied Vacant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Arthur Anderson and 
Anderson Consulting, 
“Breaking The Cycle: 
Developing an Effective 
Intervention Strategy for 
Dealing with New York City’s 
In Rem Housing Problem, 
Cost of Ownership Model,” 
12 April 1995, p. 8. 
11 Braconi, p. 100. 
12 Moon Wha Lee, “Housing 
New York City 1996,” City of 
New York Department of 
Housing Preservation and 
Development,  September 
1999, p. 16. 
13 Local Law 37 of 1996 
amended the Administrative 
Code to give the City the 
authority to sell tax liens. 
14 Local Law 69 of 1996 
amended the in rem process 
to allow sub-borough actions 
and make third party 
transfers. 
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Program Overview 	  
The principal goal of the Third Party Transfer Initiative is to improve the housing 
conditions and quality-of-life of New York City residents, particularly those living in 
the most dilapidated buildings. To accomplish that goal, the Third Party Transfer 
Initiative changed a property tax law to avert long-term City ownership and instead 
uses a standard tax foreclosure mechanism to transfer ownership of abandoned and 
distressed properties from neglectful owners to responsible new owners. The resulting 
process quickly and cost effectively conveys buildings to pre-qualified new owners, uses 
public resources to leverage private capital for complete building rehabilitation, and 
thus preserves and rehabilitates the City’s existing housing stock. 
Under the new authority, in rem 




4,000 	  	  
3,000 	  	  
2,000 	  	  
1,000 
foreclosures for Tax Class 2 multiple 
dwellings of four or more units can 
occur when owners have a year or 
more of tax and municipal charge 
delinquencies. One- to three-unit 
buildings must have three years of 
delinquency. After the City obtains a 
foreclosure judgment, owners are 
provided a final four months to resolve 
the arrears, after which time, subject to 
City Council review, the City may 
transfer title of unredeemed properties 





’97   ’98   ’99   ’00   ’01   ’02   ’03   ’04   ’05   ’06   ’07   ’08   ’09  ’10  ’11 Neighborhood Restore, a non- 
profit entity established by the Enter- 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Memorandum of Under- 
standing between The City of 
New York and Neighborhood 
Restore Housing Development 
Fund Corporation, 2 August 
1999. 
prise Foundation and the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, assumes interim 
ownership and, in turn, transfers ownership to new for-profit and not-for-profit owners 
selected by HPD through a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) process. The prospective 
owners manage the properties and secure rehabilitation financing prior to the final 
transfer, expected within one year of initial conveyance. Neighborhood Restore pro- 
vides technical assistance to and oversees management by the prospective owners.15 
By transferring ownership from ineffective, irresponsible owners to capable owners 
who will upgrade the buildings, this new initiative breaks the old cycle of disrepair and 
abandonment and ensures that troubled housing is not written off. In contrast to an 
enforcement policy that relied on long-term City management and subsidy, this Initia- 
tive strategically uses government intervention and resources to facilitate the return of 
residential building ownership to the private real estate sector. 
The Third Party Transfer Initiative design is geared to working with the occupancy 
and rental characteristics of the properties to maximize both the affordability for 
existing tenants and economic viability for the new owners. To the extent that the 
properties include vacant units, they will be leased at market rents when rehabilitation 
is completed. Setting the vacant units at market levels provides additional income to 
mitigate the need for rent increases for the occupied units. Rents on occupied units are 
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not increased until the completion of rehabilitation, with a goal of implementing the 
lowest possible increases to cover post-rehabilitation project costs. 
The City has completed the Pilot round of the Third Party Transfer Initiative in the 
South Bronx and is currently implementing additional rounds. 	  	  
Taking It to the Neighborhood: The South Bronx Pilot 	  
In June 1997, the City initiated the first pilot in rem action against 174 tax delin- 
quent properties in tax map Section 10 of the Bronx, which includes portions of the 
Hunts Point, Longwood, Melrose, Morrisania, Mott Haven, and Port Morris neighbor- 
hoods. The area was targeted by HPD for the Pilot round because it is a region of the 
city with significant distressed property as well as substantial prior City investments in 
housing. On August 11, 1999, 46 of the properties (27 buildings and 19 vacant lots) in 
the South Bronx were transferred to Neighborhood Restore, with interim manage- 
ment provided by the designated owners.16 
The Bronx Pilot provides important results of the implementation of the Third 
Party Transfer Initiative. The first measure of the Initiative’s success is the collection  
of delinquent taxes for properties included in the action. At the end of the repayment 
period, a total of 87 owners had either paid their taxes or entered into a payment 
agreement with the Department of Finance. The total value of the taxes collected from 
those properties thus far is more than $6.4 million.17 Some owners were also required 
to enter into building repair agreements with HPD. As the initiative becomes known 
more widely, the City expects the prospect of and subsequent filing of City foreclosure 
actions to be a significant impetus for owners to address their tax delinquencies. 
The initiative’s second measure of success is the transfer of 46 properties to respon- 
sible new owners. The properties were taken from irresponsible owners who had failed 
to maintain them adequately and were transferred to responsible new for-profit and 
non-profit owners with established track records as property managers and a demon- 
strated ability to address building repairs and other needs. 
Neighborhood Restore and the new owner/managers stabilized the buildings, 
removed Housing Maintenance Code violations, and formalized rent structures with 
the tenants. For example, one of the first steps taken by Neighborhood Restore and the 
new owner/managers was to survey all the occupied units with children under the age 
of seven for possible hazardous lead paint conditions. The new owners safeguarded the 
health of the children by immediately correcting all the potential problems in accor- 
dance with local lead paint requirements. Tenants in two buildings on East 167th and 
168th Streets had long suffered inadequate heat from a failing boiler. The new owner 
of the properties immediately replaced the boilers, and over the course of the 1999- 
2000 winter the tenants enjoyed adequate heat for the first time in many years. 
Neighborhood Restore required the owner/managers to inspect all roofs to deter- 
mine whether they were water tight and to make necessary repairs, and to identify 
apartments where young children reside to ensure child window guards are in place. 
Other repairs made during Neighborhood Restore’s interim ownership period in- 
cluded elevator brake replacement, sewer line cleaning, rodent treatment, floor repair, 
repair of water leaks, lock replacement, and appliance repair and replacement. 
Legislation [now] 
allows the City to 
use the foreclosure 
process to transfer 
ownership of tax 
delinquent properties 
directly to new 
owners without 
taking title itself, 
avoiding the cost of 
managing the prop- 
erties and preparing 
them for sale. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Two additional properties 
were included later, bringing 
the total to 48. Fourteen 
properties were removed from 
the pilot for legal or technical 
reasons. 
17 City of New York Department 
of Finance records as of 10 
August 2000. 
  	  
	   94	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Author’s telephone 
conversations with the 
tenants on 14 September 
2000. 
In addition to physical repairs, many other management responsibilities had been 
neglected at these properties. Many leases had lapsed and had not been renewed, and 
rents were not consistently collected.Within several weeks of Neighborhood Restore’s 
taking interim ownership, the new owner/managers surveyed all tenants to determine 
the status of leases and to complete necessary registrations. Since the goal of the Third 
Party Transfer Initiative is not to displace the residents, but to stabilize rent collections, 
the owner/managers reviewed individual rent histories and established a fair rent on  
the units where there was no prior legal rent.When there were cases where rents could 
have been legitimately increased, but doing so would have created a hardship for the 
residents, lower rents were adopted. 
While addressing the most pressing needs, the new owners and Neighborhood 
Restore were also preparing the properties for final transfer. The owner/managers 
worked with Neighborhood Restore, HPD, and the participating lending institutions to 
develop the scope of rehabilitation work for each building, and to secure the financing 
to fund those renovations.Within the first year of Neighborhood Restore’s interim 
ownership, the new owner/managers conducted joint site walk-through inspections, 
identified construction costs, submitted plans to HPD for approval, developed construc- 
tion documents, and sought Department of Building approvals for rehabilitation. 
In August 2000, Neighborhood Restore completed the transfer of 15 multi-family 
buildings, containing over 270 units, to the new owners. The full rehabilitation of these 
buildings is underway and will be completed within a 12-month period from that date 
of transfer. Typically this may include replacing one or more of the heating, electrical, 
and plumbing systems, as well as addressing structural and building envelope issues. In 
addition, units are being completely rehabilitated, which includes repairing and replac- 
ing windows, walls, doors, appliances, and kitchen and bathroom fixtures. 
In one of the Bronx Pilot properties, 1203 Fulton Avenue, residents described the 
impact of the Third Party Transfer Initiative on their building and their lives. One 
elderly tenant, Ethyl Moses, said,“For the past 10 years this building has been in terrible 
condition.When the new owner came in they started making major repairs. They did 
the floors, they replaced the windows and doors, and they are redoing the bathroom 
and kitchen. It is wonderful and I am very grateful that these repairs are being made. 
I will finally have a nice place to live.”Another long time tenant, Claris Morgan, 
observed,“Everything in poor condition is being replaced. They are doing a beautiful 
job. In 1973 the building was the best kept in the Bronx but it just went down horribly. 
Now it is coming back to what it was before. It is making a big difference in my life.”18 
Neighborhood Restore has worked with HPD to identify appropriate uses for the 
vacant lots conveyed through the action. First, citywide and Bronx-based not-for-profit 
organizations were contacted to solicit their interest in purchasing lots for housing or 
other community development purposes. As a result, the New York City Housing 
Partnership is developing several of the lots through its homeownership construction 
program. Neighborhood Restore also wrote to owners whose homes are adjacent to 
the lots, asking if they are interested in purchasing them to expand the open space 
surrounding their housing. Some owners are following through on this offer. One lot is 
expected to be added as open space for the community through the New York Resto- 
ration Project, and another lot will be used as a vegetable garden for residents of an 
adjacent city-run AIDS facility. Neighborhood Restore is also working with a devel- 
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oper who hopes to purchase a number of lots for redevelopment housing; a restrictive 
covenant will ensure that affordable housing is created. 
The remaining small clusters of 1- to 4-unit properties will be transferred to the 
new owners later this year. As with the other properties, all the buildings will be 
rehabilitated and restored to compliance with the Housing Maintenance Code.When 
the last few properties are transferred later this year, the Bronx Pilot will have saved 
more than 300 units of scarce affordable housing. For the first time, residents living in 
15 multi-family buildings will have safe and sanitary living conditions, families in 12 
one- to four-unit buildings will have decent homes, and 19 vacant lots will have been 
put to constructive uses including new residential housing. 	  
Figure 3. Bronx Pilot – Final Cost Summary for Multiple Dwelling Clusters 	  


















I 78 $3,655,000 $46,859 $4,137,658 $885,000 $2,755,000 $35,321 $497,658 
IIA 53 3,047,566 57,501 3,495,224 903,652 b $2,502,582 c $47,219 $88,990 
IIB 38 1,787,071 47,028 2,213,943 538,754 b $1,610,556 $42,383 $64,633 
III 90 4,755,783 52,842 5,757,121 1,449,229 b $2,468,000 $27,422 $1,839,892 d 
IV 21 1,215,378 57,875 1,450,424 240,732 b $1,158,839 $55,183 $50,853 
Total280 $14,460,798 $51,646 $17,054,370 $4,017,367 $10,494,977 $37,482 $2,542,026 	  
a Including contingency. b HDC providing permanent funding. c Includes $1,324,651 HOME funds. d LIHTC equity. 	  
Moving from Abandonment to Effective Ownership: The Process 	  
The Department of Housing Preservation and Development is the agency prima- 
rily responsible for the development, implementation, and operation of the process.  
As the Third Party Transfer Initiative is closely linked to the City’s sale of tax liens,  
the process also involves the Department of Finance and the Law Department. 	  
Targeting Properties for Potential Inclusion 
HPD targets properties in neighborhoods where housing revitalization is a critical 
need, and where the Initiative will enhance other HPD investments. As HPD identifies 
properties where basic services are lacking, or where owners are grossly mismanaging 
their buildings, they are added to the list of potential Third Party Transfer Initiative 
properties. Such buildings are identified through HPD’s Housing Litigation Division, 
which refers properties it has identified as lacking essential services based on information 
gathered in its legal enforcement of the Housing Maintenance Code. Referrals may also 
come from the agency’s Emergency Repair Program, which is responsible for correcting 
hazardous conditions in multiple-unit dwellings when owners fail to make the repairs. 
Under Article 7A of the New York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings 
Law, to safeguard the health and safety of the tenants, a court may appoint an adminis- 
trator to take over the day-to-day management of a multiple dwelling if its owner has 
effectively abandoned the property. These buildings are often among the most dilapi- 
dated properties in the City. For “Article 7A” buildings in particular, the Third Party 
Transfer Initiative brings a long-term solution to seemingly intractable situations. 
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The New York City 
Department of Housing 
Preservation and 
Development can be 
accessed online at 
www.nyc.gov/hpd. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 When inspections deter- 
mine an emergency condition 
exists, the owner of the 
building is notified and 
instructed to repair the 
condition. If the owner fails 
to make the repair HPD will 
repair the problem through 
the Emergency Repair 
Program (ERP) and impose 
a lien to recover the cost. 
Under HPD oversight, the court-appointed administrator uses the rent roll to stabi- 
lize the building. More substantive repairs, such as roof or boiler replacement, are paid for 
by HPD, and the costs become liens against the buildings.While this addresses the building’s 
immediate problems, the long-term problems often remain. For many 7A buildings the 
Third Party Transfer Initiative is the solution because the new owner will comprehen- 
sively address the building’s problems and restore it to health and long-term viability. 
A property must have tax and municipal charge delinquencies to be eligible to be 
included in an in rem foreclosure leading to third party transfer. For most tax delinquent 
properties in fair or good condition the City sells the tax lien. The liens are sold to a 
trust, which uses them as collateral to issue bonds. The trust sells the bonds to investors 
for cash, and the cash is used to pay the City for the liens.When the Department of 
Finance issues the list of properties slated for tax lien sales, HPD field staff review the 
list and exclude those that need additional intervention through programs such as the 
Third Party Transfer Initiative. 
HPD first determines if any properties must be excluded from the tax lien sale 
because they meet the statutory definition of distressed as established by Local Law 
37 of 1996. Statutorily distressed properties are currently defined as those with 
• a 15 percent or more tax lien-to-market value ratio 	  
• and 5 or more hazardous Housing Maintenance Code violations (Class B), 
and/or 5 or more immediately hazardous Housing Maintenance Code violations 
(Class C) per dwelling unit 
• and/or $1,000 or more in HPD Emergency Repair Program liens per building.19 
The law also gives HPD discretionary authority to exclude from the tax lien sales 
properties it deems distressed. Finally, HPD excludes properties that are already the 
subject of other programmatic HPD intervention or rehabilitation efforts or that are 
ineligible for other reasons. 
Together, the properties targeted by HPD and those excluded by HPD from the 
tax lien sale form a pool of properties for inclusion in a Third Party Transfer in rem 
foreclosure actions. 	  
Foreclosing on the Properties 
Once properties are identified for an upcoming in rem foreclosure action, the 
owners are given a pre-foreclosure warning (the Notice Of Possible Foreclosure) and 
the opportunity to pay their property tax or municipal charge delinquencies. Owners 
can pay the debts in full or enter installment agreements with the Department of 
Finance. Either payment arrangement eliminates the inclusion of the property in the 
formal filing of the in rem action, which is the first step towards transferring ownership 
of the property. The Department of Finance offers favorable terms for installment plans 
entered into at this stage of the process. Exact terms depend upon the amount of the 
initial payment and length of the delinquency, but installment payments can be made 
over a period as long as eight years. 
Approximately two months later, the Department of Finance requests that the Law 
Department file an in rem foreclosure action with the New York State Supreme Court 
against those properties that have not made any arrangements to pay their delinquent 
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taxes. After filing of the foreclosure motion and prior to issuance of the judgment of 
foreclosure, owners have continuing opportunities to make payment arrangements. 
During the pendency of the in rem action, owners who want to execute an installment 
agreement with Finance must meet the following conditions: compliance with HPD 
property registration requirements; execution of an agreement with HPD to correct all 
existing Housing Maintenance Code violations; and an agreement to participate in a 
housing education program when directed by HPD to do so. During this part of the 
process, HPD does extensive owner outreach to encourage owners not only to resolve 
their tax arrears, but also to seek assistance to deal with any physical or management 
issues affecting the buildings’ underlying viability. 
At the conclusion of the initial action filing period, the Department of Finance 
transmits the addresses of the remaining properties to the Law Department, which 
formally makes a request for a judgment of foreclosure to the New York State Supreme 
Court. The length of time it takes to render judgment is under Court control but may 
take as little as a day or several months. 
When the final judgment of foreclosure has been entered, DOF notifies the owner 
and parties at interest that there is a final four-month mandatory redemption period in 
which to pay any outstanding taxes and other liens and thus retain title to the property. 
Property owners who have waited until the in rem judgment is obtained to enter into 
agreements with the Department of Finance are offered less favorable terms. Fifty 
percent of the delinquent taxes and liens must be paid before entering into the agree- 
ment, with the remainder paid in full within four quarters. Further, to obtain an install- 
ment agreement after judgment, the required HPD recommendation is based on an 
expanded review, which considers such other factors as the owner’s history of owner- 
ship/management of this and other properties, record of Housing Maintenance Code 
violations, lien or mortgage foreclosures, tenant complaint history, ability to manage 
and improve the property, and financial capacity. 	  
Transferring the Properties 	  
At the beginning of the final redemption period, HPD distributes tenant letters to 
every known tenant in the affected buildings. These letters explain the foreclosure 
process, advise that the properties may be transferred to new ownership, and provide 
assurance that their rights as tenants are unaffected. 
After the mandatory redemption period has ended, HPD selects a qualified new 
responsible owner for each property. In the Bronx Pilot round, HPD’s review of the 
RFQ responses was concurrent with the new owner selection period. For subsequent 
rounds, HPD will already have a pool of qualified owners to draw from. 
At this time HPD also determines which properties will be clustered together for 
sale. HPD clusters properties to provide an optimum mix of vacant and occupied units 
based on the available foreclosure property inventory. By including several buildings in  
a single cluster, revenue from filling vacant units can subsidize occupied unit rents. 
Financing can be developed for clusters that will be less expensive than if the financing 
were developed for each building individually. HPD also clusters buildings to take 
advantage of the expertise of specific new owners. For example, one- to four-unit 
properties or single room occupancies (SROs) may be grouped together and transferred 
to a new owner with experience rehabilitating that type of property. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tenants in two 
buildings on East 
167th and 168th 
Streets had long 
suffered inadequate 
heat from a failing 
boiler. The new 
owner of the proper- 
ties  immediately 
replaced the boilers, 
and over the course 
of the 1999-2000 
winter the tenants 
enjoyed adequate 
heat for the first 
time in many years. 
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Following the mandatory redemption period, HPD has four months to transfer the 
property to the new owner. This period can be extended up to 45 days for the City 
Council to review and potentially reject the selection of the proposed new owner of 
any property. If the title of the property is not transferred within the four month post- 
judgment period as tolled by the City Council review, title of the property reverts to 
the original owner. 
It would be difficult to complete the transfer within the legislatively required four- 
month post-redemption period were it not for Neighborhood Restore, because of the 
complexity and time-consuming nature of the property transfer and the process to 
obtain rehabilitation financing. Neighborhood Restore is a non-profit entity established 	  	  
Third Party Transfer Initiative Process 	  
• HPD identifies distressed properties for inclusion ongoing 
Pre-Filing 2 - 3 months 
• HPD provides the Department of Finance with targeted tax blocks 
• Final Tax delinquency notices to owners of affected parcels 	  
- - - - - - - - - - - IN REM ACTION FILED - - - - - - - - - - - 
Action Filed 6-8 months 
• City commences an in rem action against property owners in arrears for selected tax blocks 
• Outreach by HPD to encourage tax and code compliance 
• Installment agreements available subject to HPD conditions 
• Judgment of foreclosure requested by City, issued by the New York Supreme Court 	  
- - - - - - - - - - - - JUDGMENT ENTERED - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mandatory Redemption Period 4 months 
• Owner has 4 months to pay outstanding taxes and other liens and retain title to the property 
• Tenant notification by HPD 
• Final outreach by HPD 
• Installment agreements are available with more limited terms 	  
Transfer Period 4 months 
• HPD has 4 months to transfer title, subject to City Council review 
• Clusters assembled 
• HPD selects the responsible new owners from prequalified pool 	  
City Council Review up to an additional 45 days 
• City Council has up to 45 days to review the proposed new owners, tolling transfer period 
• HPD transfers interim ownership to Neighborhood Restore 	  
Interim Ownership Period 12 months 
• Neighborhood Restore establishes agreements to use selected new owners as property 
managers 
• New owners/property managers stabilize and manage properties, and develop scopes of work 
• Rehabilitation financing packages are developed 
• Neighborhood Restore transfers properties to new owners/ rehabilitation loans closed 	  
- - - - - - - - - - - TRANSFER PROCESS COMPLETED - - - - - - - - - - - 
Properties are rehabilitated 12 months 
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by the Enterprise Foundation and the Local Initiatives Support Corporation to assist the 
City with the Third Party Transfer Initiative. HPD initially conveys the properties to 
Neighborhood Restore as interim owner. This arrangement provides an opportunity  
to stabilize the properties, arrange rehabilitation financing, and to prepare the legal 
documents for final transfer to the new owners. Neighborhood Restore arranges and 
formalizes agreements with the qualified new owners who act as property managers 
(owner/managers) during the period of Neighborhood Restore’s interim ownership.  
As an additional benefit, Neighborhood Restore also provides technical assistance to  
the prospective new owners as they take over the day-to-day management of the 
properties in preparation for the final transfer. 
During the Neighborhood Restore ownership period the owner/managers operate, 
manage, lease, and direct the operations of the properties. Their first responsibility is to 
inspect the properties to identify hazardous conditions, comply with lead paint regula- 
tions, and determine which repairs need immediate attention and which can be de- 
ferred for inclusion in the overall rehabilitation. The owner/managers also canvass the 
properties to identify the current occupants and attempt to obtain copies of their 
current leases. Finally, they work with Neighborhood Restore to update leases, enter 
new leases, and begin legal proceedings against unlawful residents. 
While this is occurring, the owner/managers establish the scope of work required 
for each individual property. The proposed scope of work is reviewed by HPD and the 
lending institution(s) participating in the rehabilitation financing. A final walk-through 
inspection of the building is conducted by all the parties involved before the rehabilita- 
tion financing is underwritten and finalized. Once the rehabilitation financing is in 
place, Neighborhood Restore transfers title of the property to the new owners, and the 
construction closing takes place, completing the Third Party Transfer process. 	  
Selection of New Responsible Owners 	  
The Request for Qualifications (RFQ) to identify prospective new owners for the 
Bronx Pilot met with an overwhelming response—more than 120 requests for partici- 
pation were received from a wide variety of for-profit and non-profit owner/developer 
entities. From that group, 69 were qualified as eligible new owners. The new owners 
eventually selected for the Bronx Pilot included two for-profit owners with substantial 
experience in turning around distressed property, two locally based non-profits, and  
two citywide non-profits, one of which focuses on tenant-controlled housing. 
For-profit and non-profit ownership entities interested in becoming new owners of 
transferred properties through the Third Party Transfer Initiative must demonstrate 
residential management experience, experience in rehabilitation of occupied residential 
property, financial capacity, and the capacity to carry out the work. Other properties 
they own must be current, within two quarters, with all property and water and sewer 
charges or be addressed by current tax repayment agreements. Finally, they can be 
rejected if adverse findings are made regarding a variety of issues, including tax delin- 
quencies, mortgage arrears or insolvency, record of Housing Maintenance Code viola- 
tions, tenant harassment, illegal activities, negative history with HPD, etc. 
	  
The website for the 
Enterprise Foundation 
is www.enterprise 
foundation.org. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
One elderly tenant 
said,“For the past 
10 years this build- 
ing has been in 
terrible condition. 
When the new  
owner came in they 
started making  
major repairs.… It is 
wonderful and I am 
very grateful…. I  
will finally have a 
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For-profit developers 
want to become 
owners of properties 
that will be made 
economically viable 
and become worth- 
while  assets….  Not- 
for-profit   organiza- 
tions  participate 
because of the pros- 
pect of…assisting 
the residents and 
strengthening the 
neighborhoods in 
which they work. 
Non-profit organizations may also apply on behalf of tenants interested in owning 
the properties. The non-profit organization would take ownership initially and transfer 
the property to the tenants after rehabilitation and a period of stable management. 
In April 2000, HPD issued a second RFQ, which included a number of changes to 
simplify and improve the application process. Applicants who were qualified under the 
first RFQ can affirm their continued interest. Of the more than 150 responses to the 
second RFQ, approximately one-third were respondents reaffirming their interest. 
Entities that have participated in relevant HPD rehabilitation or development programs 
during the last five years are provided an abbreviated application.While respondents to 
the first RFQ were scored, respondents to the second RFQ will be identified only as 
qualified or unqualified. 
One of the lessons learned from the Bronx Pilot is that the new owners must have 
the ability to obtain private financing and to provide equity for rehabilitating the 
properties. As part of the second RFQ, HPD has placed a greater emphasis on financial 
capacity. HPD also evaluates credit histories and financial and other references. 
In their applications, respondents are allowed to express a preference for specific 
properties and for properties in specific neighborhoods. However, there is no guarantee 
that they will be selected for those properties.When assigning properties from the 
qualified owner pool HPD considers additional factors, including proximity of the 
Third Party Transfer Initiative properties to properties already owned by the potential 
new owner, the potential new owner’s experience developing and managing similar 
properties, and the potential new owner’s ability to work with government agencies. 
HPD will continue to use the pool of applicants qualified through the second RFQ  
for future Third Party Transfer Initiative rounds and will issue additional RFQs on a 
periodic basis. 	  
Incentives for Participants 
There are a number of reasons for both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations 
to participate in the Third Party Transfer Initiative. For-profit developers want to 
become owners of properties that will be made economically viable and become 
worthwhile assets, and often desire to strengthen neighborhoods where they have 
previous investments. Not-for-profit organizations participate because of the prospect 
of rehabilitating and preserving affordable housing and thereby assisting the residents 
and strengthening the neighborhoods in which they work. 
Qualified new owners acquire what will be viable properties at a low cost. The 
costs are minimal compared to buying and rehabilitating a property on the open 
market because the new owner’s equity investment is targeted for rehabilitation, not 
acquisition. In addition, the existing liens on the property are cleared, and the building 
is given a fresh start. As a result, the debt service will be lower than for a comparable 
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Financing: Sources and Strategies 	  
Lien forgiveness and cross subsidization of rents may not be enough to ensure the 
long-term financial viability of the properties, many of which require extensive reha- 
bilitation. The City leverages private market rate loans with City rehabilitation funds to 
reduce rehabilitation costs and provides a variety of short and long-term tax incentives. 
HPD has several programs that use low interest loans to rehabilitate properties 
where rents and tenant incomes are too low to support market-rate financing. For the 
multi-family property clusters, the Third Party Transfer Initiative will generally provide 
rehabilitation funding support through HPD’s Participation Loan Program (PLP). PLP 
was originally created in the mid-1970s to reverse the deterioration of low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods by leveraging low-cost City funds with market-rate 
financing provided by various New York City lenders. It operates primarily for build- 
ings of 20 or more units needing moderate rehabilitation including replacement of 
building systems and modernization of apartment interiors. As such, it is an ideal 
mechanism for the Third Party Transfer Initiative. 
PLP blends City financing at 1 percent, in combination with federal funds where 
appropriate, and market rate financing from banks and other private lenders, signifi- 
cantly reducing the cost of the rehabilitation loan. Because of the lower cost, rent 
increases for occupied units in properties rehabilitated through PLP, including those in 
the Third Party Transfer Initiative, are typically limited to $5 to $10 per room.20 
Through the Neighborhood Homes Program, HPD conveys occupied one- to 
four-family buildings to selected community-based not-for-profit organizations for 
rehabilitation. The new owners will receive funding in the form of an evaporating loan 
from HPD and a loan from the Local Initiative Support Corporation. Once the reha- 
bilitation is completed, each building will be marketed to the existing tenants or other 
buyers who agree to reside in the building and who qualify for mortgage financing to 
purchase the property. 
In addition, the City offers tax incentive programs that reduce the cost of operation 
prior to and after rehabilitation. Reducing the tax burden on the rehabilitated proper- 
ties reduces the cost of operating the buildings, and reduces the pressure to increase 
rents, thus allowing occupied units to remain affordable. 
Initially, the City seeks approval from the City Council to exempt the properties 
from property tax. At the same time the City Council reviews HPD’s new owner 
selection determination.With City Council approval, during the approximately one 
year of Neighborhood Restore ownership the properties are provided a full property 
tax exemption. Neighborhood Restore is a non-profit eligible for this tax exemption 
under Article XI of the New York State Housing Finance Law. 
HPD also requests that the City Council approve the designation of the properties 
as Urban Development Action Area Projects (UDAAP). The Urban Development 
Action Area Act was specifically enacted “to provide incentives for the correction of 
[such] substandard, insanitary, blighted, deteriorated or deteriorating conditions” associ- 
ated with in rem housing.21 UDAAP designation confers tax exemption on the building 
improvements portion of the property taxes for up to 20 years, with 10 years of full 
exemption and a 10-year phase-out to full taxes. During the period of UDAAP tax 
exemption, the land portion of the taxes remain in effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Under HPD’s delegated 
processing procedures, the 
private lender is given 
primary responsibility for 
loan underwriting and 
processing. In general, the 
City’s share of the financing, 
including federal funds, is 65 
percent of the total financ- 
ing. The total City and 
private lender financing cost 
is generally limited to 90 
percent of the total project 
development cost, with a 
maximum term of 30 years. 
21 Section 691. Policy and 
purposes of article, Article 
16, Urban Development 
Action Area Act, New York 
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Selected Properties from the Second Round 
of the Third Party Transfer Initiative 	  
139 West 128th Street, Manhattan. 16-unit building, which though listed as vacant, 
is currently occupied by a number of residents; 565 hazardous and immediately hazardous 
housing violations of record (“B” and “C” violations); $269,642 in liens. Referred for 
inclusion by HPD’s Housing Litigation Division. 
The building has an open front door and graffiti on the first level facade. Some 
apartments are missing entrance doors, the public stairway is unstable, plywood covers 
openings in the walls, and there are exposed and dangling light fixtures. Apartments have 
a range of severely deteriorated conditions, from collapsing ceilings to walls open to 
plumbing and electrical systems. 
213 West 111th Street, Manhattan. 24-unit occupied building; 721 B and C viola- 
tions; $775,545 in liens. Included in current action as part of HPD’s Harlem Gateway 
initiative for deteriorated buildings near Central Park North where HPD has made major 
housing investments through other programs. 
This building has severely deteriorated apartment conditions, including floors and 
walls in bathrooms damaged as the result of water leakage, as well as inadequate heat and 
hot water. Public areas are badly decayed, with dangerous stairways, debris, and open 
doorways. 
370 Lenox Avenue, Manhattan. 39-unit building with vacate order but with some 
families still living in the building; 663 B and C violations; $1,882,711 in liens; referred 
through the 7A Program as a building too devastated to be appropriate for the scope of 
stabilization services provided by that program. 
A fire in May of 1998 destroyed the top three floors of the building, and a vacate 
order was placed on the building. Some tenants moved back in, even though there is no 
heat or hot water, public areas are in extreme disrepair and many apartments are in 
shambles. Extensive drug activities take place within and outside of the building. A local 
community group has been working with HPD to relocate families so that the building can 
be sealed until rehabilitation is made possible through the Third Party Transfer Initiative. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Section 11-243 of the 
Administrative Code of the 
City of New York (formerly 
Section J51-2.5). 
Once rehabilitation is completed, HPD is able to confer alternate ongoing tax 
exemption and abatement through tax incentive programs such as its J-51 program.22 
J-51 provides for a range of tax benefits, including up to 34 years of tax exemption 
from the increase in real estate taxes resulting from the improvements. The program 
also allows for the abatement of a percentage of the annual tax bill for up to 20 years. 
The amount of the benefits depends on the level of rehabilitation work, and for the 
Third Party Transfer Initiative will generally be 150 percent of the certified reasonable 
cost. 
Preparing the rehabilitation financing packages is difficult, as HPD has extremely 
limited control over the characteristics of the buildings and tenants that become part of 
the final transfer portfolios. Each building has unique physical repair and rehabilitation 
needs, requiring different levels of capital investment. Depending on factors such as 
vacancy rates, tenant income, and capital needs, various financing sources must be 
identified and blended together. As a result, financing packages must be first tailored to 
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The process can also be challenging because of the lack of early or complete 
information on the physical and capital needs of the buildings. Given the adversarial 
nature of the in rem foreclosure proceedings, the prior owners are often uncooperative. 
As a result, HPD may be unable to gain sufficient access to the interior of the fore- 
closed buildings until title has been transferred. At times, HPD has to cluster properties 
and identify new owners without the physical inspections or property profiles necessary 
to inform cluster financing decisions fully. 
Because the City is committed to rehabilitating every building transferred through 
the initiative, HPD cannot eliminate those with high subsidy requirements. The 
financing packages must ensure affordable rents for low-income residents without 
relying on rent subsidies, and must also ensure that rehabilitation addresses building 
conditions and long-term needs. Further, the new owners have varying access to 
private capital. As the buildings have significant capital needs and there are finite 
government funding resources, the financing packages are more feasible when the  
new owner has greater access to private capital. 	  
Funding 
Funding for the Third Party Transfer Initiative comes from a variety of sources, 
private and public. The new owners provide equity and obtain private financing from 
banks and financial institutions. The private financing obtained by the new owners is 
blended with City Capital Budget funds to reduce the total 
financing cost and ensure the rehabilitation remains affordable. 
Federal housing funds, such as HOME program funds, and Low 
	  
Figure 4. Bronx Pilot Funding Sources 
Income Housing Tax Credit equity may also be included to 





% of Total 
15.1 
Because each round of Third Party Transfer Initiative properties City Capital (loans) 10,460,326 47.5 
will have buildings with different characteristics and rehabilitation Other City (loans) 3,132,367 14.2 
needs, the sources and amounts of funds for each round will be Private 5,107,026 23.2 
different. For the Bronx Pilot round of the Third Party Transfer TOTAL $22,033,354 100.0 
Initiative the funding sources are shown in figure 4. 	   	   	  
Rehabilitation of the properties transferred in the first round cost an average of 
$60,908 per dwelling unit for properties with 5 or more units. Rehabilitation of the 
smaller buildings cost an average of $106,071 per dwelling unit. Program costs also 
include $2,009,000 to establish and operate Neighborhood Restore for the first year. 
Future costs will be less as the one-time cost of establishing Neighborhood Restore 
will not be included. 	  
Funding Sources 
Multiple Dwellings - 16 properties with 283 pre- and 280 
post-rehab units divided into 4 clusters with rehabilitation 
costs of $60,908 per unit. Funding sources are shown in figure 5. 
Figure 5. Multiple Dwellings Funding Sources 	  
City Capital $9,170,326 
Federal HOME 1,324,651 
Other City (HDC) 3,132,367 
Private (owner equity, bank 
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Figure 6. Smaller Buildings Funding Sources Smaller Buildings - 12 properties with 28 units divided into   
2 clusters with rehabilitation costs of $106,071 per unit. Funding 
sources are shown in figure 6. 
While all six clusters in the Bronx Pilot utilize City capital 
funds and some type of private financing, no two clusters use the 
same combination of funding sources at the same level, or in the 
same way. Each financing package is tailored to the economic and physical conditions 
of the buildings, as well as the sophistication of the new owners. The clusters with 
small buildings use funds from LISC/Enterprise that will later be repaid with private 
bank financing, although one of those clusters requires significantly more subsidy than 
the other. One of the multiple dwelling clusters utilizes federal HOME funds, while 
another uses tax credits. Three of the four multiple dwelling clusters will use reserve 
funds from the City’s financing agency, the Housing Development Corporation, allo- 
cated specifically for HPD anti-abandonment housing initiatives, while the fourth uses 
only City Capital funds and private financing. 	  	  
COSTS AND BENEFITS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Based on an average of 
$2.2 million per property to 
acquire, manage, repair, and 
dispose of as per Arthur 
Anderson report “Breaking 
the Cycle.” 
24 “Inside the Budget,” City 
of New York Independent 
Budget Office, 31 July 2000, 
pp. 1-2. 
The Bronx Pilot provides important information about the cost avoidance possible 
through the Third Party Transfer Initiative. Had the City taken ownership of the 174 
properties under the prior in rem foreclosure approach, and stayed in City ownership 
for an average of 19 years, it would have cost the City as much as $382.8 million to 
manage and dispose of those properties.23 Through the Third Party Initiative, the City 
avoided this cost by returning the buildings to tax paying status with responsible new 
owners, and leveraging its financing with private sector funds to achieve building 
rehabilitation. 
A further benefit of the Third Party Transfer Initiative is the short turnaround time 
for the buildings to be transferred to new owners. For the first group of properties, 
from the date the properties were included in the in rem action to the date of the final 
transfer was just 26 months. 
Savings from the Third Party Transfer Initiative will reduce the need to rely on 
scarce federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to pay for repairs 
and rehabilitation of in rem properties. The New York City Independent Budget Office 
noted,“Maintenance of in rem properties is consuming a declining share of CDBG 
spending each year, from a peak of $154.8 million in 1996, down to $75.8 million in 
1999. As spending on in rem properties has declined, CDBG funds used to support 
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Personnel Costs 	  
Across HPD’s divisions, at the Department of Finance, and the Law Department, 
numerous staff were involved in implementing the Third Party Transfer Initiative. Most 
of the work was such that it could be performed by existing staff and be absorbed into 
their already established responsibilities. 
The HPD staff who spend 100 percent of their time on the Third Party Transfer 
Initiative include a Program Director and three support staff responsible for pre-transfer 
coordination and programmatic reporting; and a Project Manager responsible for 
reviewing financial packages and coordinating closings. In addition, a Director of 
Analysis, a Program Director, and two Senior Executive staff spend from one-quarter to 
one-third of their time managing and overseeing work related to the Third Party 
Transfer Initiative. Finally, the Office of Anti-Abandonment estimates its borough office 
staff collectively spend approximately 15 percent of its time on activities including: 
assessing properties for signs of distress, conducting owner outreach and assistance to 
encourage owners to resolve their taxes and obtain assistance to deal with any physical 
or management issues affecting the buildings’ underlying viability, and contacting 
tenants in properties where ownership will be transferred. 
To provide a very rough idea of implementation costs, HPD estimated the percent- 
age of work time spent by the HPD staff primarily responsible for the initial imple- 
mentation of the program. Those percentages applied against salaries for the staff 
involved yielded an estimate of personnel costs for program implementation of 
$523,000. 	  	  
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES AND SKEPTICISM 	  
When the Third Party Transfer Initiative was proposed, the most significant obstacle 
it faced was obtaining legislative approval. The Council was concerned about how the 
City would identify distressed properties for the Initiative, and how it would select new 
owners. 
HPD established a mechanism to identify distressed properties based on level of tax 
arrears, lien-to-market value ratio, and the extent of serious housing code violations. To 
identify responsible new owners, the City established a competitive process, including a 
wide outreach to the for-profit and non-profit real estate communities. HPD met with 
many key Council Members to explain these approaches and satisfy their concerns. 
The City also recognized the importance of input from other individuals and 
organizations that would be affected and ultimately would have to agree to the new 
program. HPD’s team engaged these interested parties early on by aggressively reaching 
out to other City departments including the finance, law, and budget agencies. The 
team also engaged in dialogues with other elected officials, community groups, neigh- 
borhood task forces, community boards, non-profits, and religious organizations. The 
team established program guidelines and worked with the City’s budget office to obtain 
rehabilitation financing. All this support was necessary to gain the community backing 
needed to put a new program in place and obtain the necessary legislation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A benefit of the 
Third  Party Transfer 
Initiative is the short 
turnaround time for 
the buildings to be 
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The Third  Party 
Transfer Initiative is 
highly replicable. It 
uses government tax 
enforcement tools, 
flexible financing, is 
cost effective, applies 
to a broad range of 
neighborhood and 
property  conditions, 
and can use local 
resources to adapt 
the program to local 
conditions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael H. Schill and 
Benjamin P. Scafidi,  
“Housing Conditions and 
Problems in New York City,” 
in Michael H. Schill (ed.), 
Housing and Community 
Development in New York City: 
Facing the Future (Albany, 
NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1999), 19. 
26 “1999 New York City 
Housing and Vacancy Survey,” 
14 August 2000, p. 4. 
As the Third Party Transfer Initiative has been implemented, a further obstacle has 
been occasional tenant resistance and the belief among some tenant groups that they 
have not had equal opportunity to become the new owners. HPD is solely concerned 
with selecting the new owner that is most qualified and best able to rehabilitate and 
stabilize the property, whether that is a private sector developer, not-for-profit organiza- 
tion, or a tenant group. Given the need for quick transfers and the advanced state of 
deterioration of many Third Party Transfer Initiative properties, the City needs to count 
on the experience, financial resources, and capacity of the established for-profit and 
not-for-profit ownership community to manage, develop, and promptly rehabilitate the 
properties. However, interested tenants have the opportunity to link to qualified not- 
for-profit owners with the potential to convert the properties to tenant control after 
rehabilitation is completed and the property operation has been stabilized. 
Tenant resistance is unlikely to be as great an obstacle in another city. Because of 
several unique factors, tenants probably have greater influence in New York City than 
in other large municipalities across the country.“Unlike most other American cities, 
New York City is overwhelmingly a city of renters. According to the 1993 American 
Housing Survey, 49.1 percent of all households in central cities owned the homes in 
which they lived. In New York, however, only 30 percent of all housing units were 
owner occupied in 1996.”25 Moreover, the 1999 vacancy rate in New York City was 
3.19 percent.26 	  
Further, there is a history of tenant ownership within New York City, including 
tenant ownership models with HPD program support. One of the programs to reha- 
bilitate and dispose of City-held in rem housing gives tenants with a significant interest 
in tenant ownership the right to assume direct management and eventual ownership 
before other program options are considered. New York City has also long been a 
national center for residential cooperative ownership, with cooperatives at all income 
levels—ranging from luxury high-rises, to City- and state-assisted middle-income 
projects, to small low-income sweat equity ventures. 	  	  
REPLICATION 	  
The Third Party Transfer Initiative is highly replicable. The Initiative uses govern- 
ment tax enforcement tools, flexible financing, is cost effective, applies to a broad range 
of neighborhood and property conditions, and can use local resources to adapt the 
program to local conditions. 
Financing for the initiative is also easily replicated. Building rehabilitation can be 
easily supported by a wide variety of public and private sector funding sources. De- 
pending on their needs, municipalities can blend federal, state and/or city, and private 
funds to finance the rehabilitation of dilapidated units. Each community can use its 
established real estate community. 
The initiative’s cost savings and cost avoidance features are also replicable because 
leveraged public funds make blended public and private sector financing packages 
affordable. The costs of administering the program are recovered manyfold from 
increased tax collection, buildings returning to the tax rolls, and from savings realized 
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Resources Needed 	  
The actual costs for each municipality will depend on the level of staffing, how the 
transfer process is structured, and the degree of distress of the properties. For New York 
City there was the initial $2-million cost of establishing and operating Neighborhood 
Restore. Other municipalities may not need to fund an interim owner. 
The per-unit cost to rehabilitate individual apartments depends on the degree of 
distress, the size of the building, and on local construction costs. In the case of the 
Bronx Pilot, the per-unit rehabilitation cost ranged from $60,000 to $100,000 depend- 
ing on the size of the building. However, the per-unit costs will likely be significantly 
less for other municipalities. According to a recent study by the New York University 
School Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, the cost of residential construction in 
New York City is the highest in the nation.27 
As important as it is to consider the hard costs, to replicate the Third Party Transfer 
Initiative a municipality will also need to have or develop less tangible resources such 
as knowledge and experience with the issues surrounding developing and managing 
housing; a close working relationship between tax, legal, and housing agencies; and 
low-interest loan and/or tax incentive programs to reduce the rehabilitation and 
operating costs so that the properties will be both viable and affordable. Municipalities 
will also need to identify and establish working relationships with not-for-profit hous- 
ing organizations, and responsible private sector real estate professionals who have the 
capacity to become the new owners. Lastly, the municipality will need to have a close 
relationship with the private sector financial industry that will provide much of the 
rehabilitation funding. 	  	  
Steps to Replication 	  
To replicate the Third Party Transfer Initiative, other municipalities must first 
determine how they will structure the transfer process, and how they can best utilize 
public-private partnerships with local government, real estate developers and managers, 
not-for-profit organizations, and lending institutions. For New York City this meant 
enlisting the assistance of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise 
Foundation to create Neighborhood Restore. Other municipalities may find it more 
advantageous to create direct relationships with local lending institutions and not-for- 
profit organizations. For example, another municipality might establish a direct relation- 
ship with a local Community Development Corporation to facilitate the transfer and 
rehabilitation of distressed properties in a particular neighborhood. 
Once the transfer structure and strategy have been developed, the municipality 
must obtain the legislative authority to initiate in rem foreclosures and complete third 
party transfers. Many municipalities already have the ability to initiate foreclosures, and 
auction or assign tax liens. Those cities can modify that legal mechanism or adapt other 
legal authority to create a third party transfer process. New York City’s Local Law 37 of 
1996 can serve as a model on which to develop the legislation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Could the Third Party Trans- 
fer program be replicated  
to reclaim abandoned 
property in Massachusetts 
urban areas? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Jerry J. Salama, Michael H. 
Schill, and Martha E. Stark, 
Reducing the Cost of New 
Housing Construction in New 
York City: A Report to the New 
York City Partnership and 
Chamber of Commerce, the 
New York City Housing 
Partnership, and the New York 
City Department of Housing 
Preservation and Develop- 
ment, New York University 
School of Law, Center for 
Real Estate and Urban Policy, 
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Lastly, the municipality must identify funding for the structure of the transfer 
process it creates, and for required property rehabilitation.Whether the municipality 
completes the process through its local agencies, or establishes a public-private partner- 
ship like Neighborhood Restore, funding must be in place to transfer the titles and 
manage the properties until the transfers are complete. 
HPD had numerous low-interest loan and tax incentive programs in place already, 
which were easily adaptable to the Third Party Transfer Initiative. Other municipalities 
may have similar programs, or may need to establish programs to ensure the long-term 
financial attractiveness and viability of the properties. This is important because the 
building must have sufficient income to cover operating expenses and debt service if 
the properties are to avoid the cycle of disinvestment and disrepair that leads to tax 
delinquency and abandonment. 	  	  
CONCLUSION 	  
By changing existing legal tax enforcement authority the City was able to use the 
government power of tax foreclosure to transfer ownership of distressed tax delinquent 
properties directly to new owners without taking ownership itself. This fundamental 
change directs the worst housing stock from City ownership and utilizes the experi- 
ence and flexibility of the existing real estate community to return buildings quickly  
to sound physical and financial condition. 
This achievement provides a targeted strategy for restoring troubled buildings, 
avoiding and reducing City capital costs, redirecting scarce resources, and shortening 
rehabilitation time from five years or more to eighteen months. By preventing aban- 
donment and improving substandard housing conditions, the initiative helps to support 
the City’s existing investments in communities throughout the City. 	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